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RADAR EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS
By PHILIP J. CAROSELL of the Denver Bar
and
WILLIAM C. COOMBS* of the Denver Research Institute
of the University of Denver

Jones was found guilty of violating Section 507.2 of the Traffic
Code. The sole evidence against him was the result of a radarmeter speed check. This was obtained by the red line inscribed
on graph paper by a stylus actuated by the return of microwave
energy bouncing off the reflective surfaces of the target vehicle
into the police radar receiver. In a fraction of a second, the stylus
had delineated a line-trace to a peak speed reading of 38 m.p.h.
in a 30 m.p.h. zone. At the time, Jones was driving a five months'
old 1955 Oldsmobile, and his speedometer was seen to read about
28 m.p.h. Three other target vehicles were within the same 175
feet radio beam at the time the instrument record was made.
The above finding, repeated many times daily in some 42
states now using some variation of the radar-speed meter, is plainly
very significant and presents a number of interesting and difficult
questions.
I. WHAT IS RADAR AND ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
AND LIMITATIONS?
The difficult questions of admissibility, entrapment, judicial
notice, hearsay, prima facie evidence, and related problems, whfch
are thus presented will be dealt with by touching upon them either
directly or impliedly as we go along. We have placed our major
effort in technical explanations, for obvious reasons. We deem it
a compelling necessity, instead of reciting rules of evidence, presumably known by our readers, to devote most of this presentation
to piercing the barrier of specialized information that seems to
have resulted in a paralysis of thought afflicting the courts, lawyers, policemen, and laymen alike, when confronted with the name
"Radar". The aura of mystery surrounding this harnessed cosmic
force has produced confusion and helplessness because incomplete
dissemination of information has left the public with the mistaken
notion that an instrument of unerring and unchallengeable accuracy is involved.
Compare the radical departure from the orthodox trial, wherein demonstration of personal integrity of the motorist and openminded reception to argument by the court gave the motorist at
least the fighting chance to rely on the truth as he saw it for upholding his presumption of innocence; as against the "new" con* Graduate Electronics Engineer, presently Section Head, Electronics Division, engaged in Classified Electronics Research; formerly Supervisory Head,
Radiation Measurements Laboratory, Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, Texas; Research Associate in Guided Missiles, Boeing Airplane Co.;
Engineer-in-Charge, Radio Direction Finding Section, Countermeasures Branch,
Electronics Division, U. S. Navy, Bureau of Ships, Wash., D. C.; Radio Development Engineer, Colonial Radio Corp., Buffalo, N. Y.
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sternation the motorist experiences when a "Radar-Cop" speedmeter, advanced to roles of an instrumental Judge, Jury, and Prosecutor, is used to dominate him and subjugate anything he might
say. Whereas, all the while, it is only the too-ready police interpretation of the instrumental record and a mistaken aura of radar
infallibility that makes up the shell of positive assertion arguing
conclusively for the radar patrol officer.
Radar was shrouded in secrecy during World War II, and like
the atom bomb, captured the imagination of the American people.
This was natural because the secrecy surrounding it allowed it fo
be known only in terms of wondrous tales of performance in applications of military target tracking, missile guidance, strategic
bombardment of enemy targets, and as an aid to ship and airplane
navigation. The war-time reputation of radar has created an impression, through name alone, of such perfection in design or performance integrity, that psychologically everyone is impressed.
The Courts, among others, have ascribed to it miraculous powers
that never would be tolerated or given unquestioned acceptance in
instruments not associated with the magic name of "Radar". Unfortunately, the attributes of the great instruments of war-tinie
repute are not reflected in all of the civilian applications which
have hitched a free ride to a great reputation. Let us illustrate:
A.-How the Public and Courts are Misled
In the July, 1955, issue of Car Life Magazine under the title
"Radar-TheSilent Patrolman"we find these statements, explaining the principle of operation of the radar speed-meter:
The radar set emits signals at regular intervals.
For the sake of clarity, let's assume that it sends out
waves each tenth of a second . . . the transmitter (Tx)
sends a beam which is reflected from the oncoming automobile back to the receiver (Rx). The set electronically
records the distance from the set to the car at 89.87 feet.
One tenth of a second later, another beam hits the car
and bounces back and the distance then is recorded at
80.31 feet . . . Using the formula to determine speed by
time over a given distance, the radar stylus is activated
and moves across the paper to show a speed of 65 m.p.h
To avoid hitting other objects ahead of or behind you,
the beam is adjusted to operate in a narrow zone . . . If
it can be used to direct shells against enemy aircraft at
30,000 feet with startling accuracy, you'd best accept
our word that it can nail you for speeding.
Actually, these excerpts quite satisfactorily explain the nature
of range measurement in typical military pulse radar used in mapping or guidance applications. But, this explanation is completely
invalid when applied to police doppler radar speed-meters. Analysis of the police instrument and testimony produced under both
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direct and cross-examination during the Denver trials proved beyond dispute, with final acceptance on both sides, that contrary
to the above-cited principles of operation, the police set (1) Does
not emit signals at regular intervals, but continuously (that is,
it is not "pulse" radar but continuous wave "doppler" radar) ; (2)
Does not electronically record the distance from the set to the car;
(3)
Is incapable of measuring either time or distance, and
therefore; (4) Does not determine speed by formula or otherwise from time and distance relationships; and (5) Does not
use a narrowly adjusted beam to avoid hitting other objects ahead
or behind, but uses a beam 200 wide, which lumps into common
reception all objects out to a nominal distance of at least 175 feet.
Is evidence to be considered fair when derived from an instrument that has been called "radar", when the whole hitherto
unchallenged concept of its operation has been so erroneous as to
receive nation-wide acceptance along the lines of the above delusion?
Instead of the above principle of characteristic radar action,
the police instrument operates on the entirely different principle
that when a target is moving, the reflection of a radio wave impinging on its surface shifts in frequency from the transmitted
signal, due to motion of the vehicle, and this frequency difference
is correlated to the proportionate velocity of the reflecting surface.
This opens up a very different set of requirements to be observed in
instrument design to make it initially capable, and to preserve this
capability, of accurately representing velocity under the diverse
conditions encountered on streets and highways.
When the very concept of operation is so completely erroneous
or, similarly, when ex-military radar "experts" having only military operational experience instead of actual design acquaintance,
use their operational experience to endorse anything that is called
"radar", we see how dangerous it is for Courts and juries to accept "police radar" on faith and opinionated testimony of apparently reputable witness instead of verifiable facts dealing with
the instrument itself.
B.-Technical Descriptionof Radar and Evidence Thereon
What, exactly is RADAR? The official derivation of the coined
word "Radar" is that it comes from the descriptive phrase, "Radio
Detection And Ranging". The same definition source I states that
it would be more descriptive to make the phrase "radio directionfinding and ranging," for the direction and the range of objects
in its field of view are the two basic qualities radar has to offer.
The police "radar" set measures neither direction nor range of
target vehicles within its field of view and therefore does not even
fit this definition of radar. Rather, it belongs to a wide category
1 Official U. S. Government Publication: Report on Science at War, published
by Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy for Office of Scientific Research
and Development, Army and Navy Departments.
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of different function instruments that have been called "Radar"
simply because they happen to use a principle of reflected radio
waves. This principle of itself has nothing to do with accuracy.
Just as with any other kind of echo or reflection, the measurement
may be made accurately or inaccurately, depending on the design
integrity of the instrument used to make the measurement. There
are many kinds of "Radar," and the integrity belonging to one
category of design and purpose cannot arbitrarily be ascribed to
all "Radars". Moreover, the vast expenditures for research and
development of military radar, which in practical application requires a complex organization of highly trained personnel for proper
operation, does not allow us to infer a corresponding integrity of
research and development for police radar sets, compromised in
design and operated as they are by relatively untrained personnel.
We must further note that the military systems are dominantly pulse radar, whereas the police radar instrument uses a continuous-wave or c-wv system. Thousands of times as much work has
gone into pulse radar as into any other kind, and the overwhelming
majority of this work has been concerned with microwave-pulse
radar, not continuous-wave radar. Thus, the perfection of military
systems, derived from great research and development expenditures, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars,2 cannot arbitrarily be ascribed to the police systems of different design and
different functional use.
Referring particularly to c-w doppler radar (which is the kind
used in police sets), Reference 3 warns that quantative information is lacking on various points, even on important ones: "...
adequate information simply is not available. This situation and
others like it are the result of the fact that very little research has
been done on c-w' systems in comparison with that devoted to
pulse systems."' 3 Yet, the police system is just such a c-iv system.
Besides lack of research in continuous-wave radars, economic
and practical factors also bear on the accuracy which can be built
into an instrument. For war use, national security justified production of equipment to perform a needed service without primary
regard for the number of operators required or the overall cost of
the service. In peacetime application, however, cost and inconvenience factors of use must be considered and necessary compromises of design may not be readily found, or may leave4 the
instrument with a lower standard of, accuracy and reliability.
2 Radar System Enginecring, Radiation Laboratory Series, Vol. 1, Pages ix,
3, and 131. Edited by Louis N. Ridenour, Professor and Dean of the Graduate
College, University of Illinois, under the Radiation Laboratory, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. The twenty-eight volumes of this series are rated the
outstanding technical publication in this field. Therefore, frequent references
will be made herein to this series, as well as other authorities of unquestioned
integrity. NOTE: Hereafter Vol. 1 of the series, entitled Radar System Engineering will be referred to as R.S.E.
-1R.S.E., Chapter 5, Page 131. See 2, above.
4 Eveyclopedia Am ericava, 1953 Ed., Vol. 23, Page 115.
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Limitations of physical size, cost, weight, and engineering expediency are all capable of influencing the design of radar in ways
or flexibility required for
that will leave it without accuracy
5
unquestioned reliance thereon.
For the first time in any Court, as found from a study by the
defense of the comparatively few reported cases on this subject,"
the "Radar Trials" of Denver proved indisputable existence of
specific compromises in governing physical principles of operation,
as applied in the police instrument. This was shown first through
cross-examination of the city's own expert in the first trial, this
trial resulting in a mis-trial when the Judge ruled he was prejudiced
by false newspaper reporting when the witness was quoted as
stating the instrument indicated true velocity; whereas, the witness had actually agreed, among other points, that the police
radar "compounded confusion" when more than one target enters
the view of the radio beam.
When, in the second trial, the city avoided calling back their
expert witness of the first trial, the defense summoned a second
expert witness from the same Research Institute as the first, who
cited specific design details and world-recognized authorities in
support of proof that specific compromises in design existed in
the instrument, and that principles of operation were themselves
compromised by manner of use. This testimony was never challenged. When some 23 limiting factors were summarized as acTversely affecting the accuracy of the police radar sets, the city
attorney affirmed to the Judge that he accepted testimony as to
the existence of these limiting factors, in principle.
Moreover, no challenge was made against the defense expert's quoted authority (cited later in this paper) that it is not
possible to determine whether an observed radar indication is in
fact due to radar signal or noise, or even to determine the probability that it is signal and not noise, without duplicating the complete and innumerable circumstances attendant to each condition
of observation in controlled tests.
This controlled scientific test would require re-constructing
the entire roadway, reproducing all the conditions of radio-wave
reflection from still and moving objects, re-establishing identical
placement and movement of all vehicles in the traffic situation at
the precise moment the recording was made, and comparing the
recorded instrument velocity with the true velicity established by
independent means, in completely controlled observations. Yet,
this impracticable if not impossible condition is the burden of
proof implicitly placed on the motorist when a Judge rules that
an acquittal would require that the instrument be proven in exThe Journal of Architecture, Engineering, and Indu.stry, Vol. 9 (1948),
Page 12, by Frederick E. Brooks, Jr., Professor of Engineering, University of
Texas.
Traffic Dipw.st and Renieu. Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, February, 1954.
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cessive error at the particular time, place, and circumstance of
each alleged violation.
Notwithstanding this burden of proof that would be placed
on the motorist, when a defense expert witness appealed to the
manufacturer for test information deemed by the latter to establish the claimed 2 m.p.h. accuracy of the police-radar instrument,
his request was denied. Nor has anybody else disclosed any controlled laboratory measurements to support the claimed accuracy
limits of the instrument.
On the other hand, similarly being in no position to re-construct
the circumstances of past events in controlled tests, the city's expert in the Denver trials had only to testify from what was "told
to him" by others, less trained in electronics than he, as to the
"circumstances" under which the speed checks were made, "how"
the sets were operated, "what" they "understood" happened, and
his own "understanding" of operation as derived from a manual
of operations provided by the manufacturer of the set.
This is a serious hearsay problem, particularly since, as we
shall expand on later, it is the nature of radar that no expert can
testify, even from personal knowledge, that field and laboratory
tests of a police radar set made at one time and circumstance necessarily mean that at a different time and circumstance of alleged
violation the instrument reliably checked the speed of a motorist.
For an instrument of such caracteristics, it is clearly unscientific
and inadmissible to permit the conclusion that because a police
radar set--not necessarily the one used in checking the violationwas found reliable under ideal laboratory conditions and circumstances, it can be "assumed" to accurately reflect the actual situation at issue. Even less admissible is expert opinion which accepts
unquestioningly the non-disinterested "word" of a manual of operations, written by the manufacturer of the equipment, and devoid of the necessary supporting scientific data for proper evaluation. Obviously, the asserter of a fact is not in the equivalent
position of the person in actual possession of the fact asserted,
because in the absence of the person with actual knowledge and
personal experience thereof, he cannot be cross-examined as to the
grounds for the fact asserted nor his qualifications to make it.7
C.-Police Doppler Radar Set
Perhaps the most vital fact that would have to be established
in Court before it could properly be decided that a given police
radar instrument is in fact accurate is that the short-time frequency
stability of the instrument lies within proper limits. The reason
for this is that the police type of instrument determines vehicular
velocity by the frequency shift the motion of the vehicle causes in
the transmitted wave, and anything that causes the transmitted
beam itself to shift in frequency will result in a velocity indication
I Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 6 P. 2d 455; Carter v. People, 119 Colo. 342,
204 P. 2d 147.
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just as surely as the doppler shift produced by a moving target
vehicle. Likewise, any given vehicular velocity that is checked may
be registered in excess of its true speed by an amount proportional
to such frequency shift. No proper short-term frequency stability
has been established in Court for the police instrument.
Moreover, substitute reliance upon a statement in the "Operating and Maintenance Manual" for the police radar set will mislead
both the Courts and the police. This manual states:
The transmitter oscillator has a high inherent frequency stability on the order of plus or minus 0.1 %. If
the frequency were to try to shift out of this range due
to any changes in tube characteristics, etc., the cavity
stability is such that it would render the oscillator inoperative. In practice, the oscillator is adjusted to within
1 megacycle of 2455 megacycles.
Indeed, in the Denver trials, the City cited laboratory test as
confirmation of instrument compliance to these frequency limits,
with implication that instrumental accuracy was confirmed thereby.
Since doppler radar speed indication accuracy is, indeed, dependent on frequency stability, the cited statement is readily
seized upon by prosecution witnesses to impress the Court as a
0.1% accuracy specification; but in reality the statement connotes
no such accuracy confirmation. What does this statement mean,
insofar as any connection with instrumental accuracy of velocitil
indication is concerned? 0.1% of the 2.455 megacycles per second
transmission frequency of the police instrument is 2.455 megacycles or 2.455.000 cycles. Now, when we recall that, in accordance
with a verifiable figure cited elsewhere in the instruction book, each
7.31 cycles of doppler frequency shift corresponds to 1 m.mh.
velocity indication, we see that anything so gross as 0.1 % stability
is no error restriction at all, for a mere 731 cycles of short-term
shift out of the total leeway of 2,455,000 cycles allowed by 0.1%
frequency stability would alone correspond to error equal to the
entire 100 m.p.h. velocity range of the instrument.
In reality, an accuracy as crude as plus or minus 1 m.p.h.
would require a short-term frequency stability of 7.31/2,455,000,000 or 0.000,000, 3%, not 0.1%. Thus, we see that a frequency
stability guarantee of the order of plus or minus 0.1% does not
begin to approach the order of stability required to connote accuracy of velocity indication, missing such factor by the order of
300,000 times. The 0.1% figure in reality only connotes conformance
to channel frequency assignment, which is an altogether different
matter.
Independent authority is cited which affirms the importance
of short term stability in doppler radar and sets an even higher

330
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frequency stability requirement for military use., Attention is
also directed to requirements for careful (design) attention to
microphonics and power-supply filtering. We shall show later that
police radar sets are in fact susceptible to microphonics. We also
report, at this point, that a check-up with a major radio parts
supply house revealed a demand in great quantities for the replacement of transmitter oscillator tubes for police radar sets because
of the rapid rate at which such tubes deteriorate due to overheating. Variation in temperature is the most common cause of
frequency instability in all electronics equipment and its consequences in a police radar set may be readily inferred from the
above computations.
Upon examination of a police radar set one of the first things
to catch trained eyes is the instrument's use of a single antenna
for both transmission and reception of the radar waves. While
this is common and proper practice in military pulse radar, where
time multiplexing allows distinctive reception to take place between transmission pulses, the situation is entirely different in
continuous wave radar of the police type. In the police instrument,
transmission and reception of signal energy is not separated by
pulse spaces, but takes place simultaneously through the same antenna. To use a single antenna under this condition is hazardous
design practice because direct connection of the receiver detector
with the transmitter power source tends to damage the crystal
detector of the receiver, and makes it respond to extraneous modulation of the transmitter along with the difference frequency that
corresponds to vehicular velocity. Exceptional design attention,
not found in the police radar set, is required to render this modulation unobtrusive to the very weak reflected radar signal.9
In a police radar set, the simultaneous antenna function is
accomplished by use of a bridge-like ring modulator of the type
used, under different conditions, in telephone repeaters. However,
this has been found to be hazardous design practice in a doppler
system because it tends to introduce microphonic error. Use of two
power
separate antennas, on the other hand, keeps the transmitter
1
modulation out of the receiver and avoids this trouble.'
'R.S.E., Page 138. Under Apparatus Considerations for the simple doppler
system, it is stated: "The most important consideration in doppler work is
keeping the transmitter frequency modulation down ... it should be noted here
that short-time frequency stabilities of the order of a part in 1010 must be attained if the system is to work with full sensitivity in the presence of ground
clutter. This requires careful attention to microphonics and to power-supply
filtering." (Note that one part in 1010 is one part in ten billion or 0.000,000,01%.)
R.S.E., Pages 132-3.
1
Od.. Page 133. "It has often been suggested that a single antenna would be
satisfactory if a bridge-like system were used similar to that used in two-way
telephone repeaters. Ordinarily, however, the single antenna is not satisfactory.
For one thing, the increased antenna gain resulting from greater available dish
area is lost because of the power used in the 'artificial' antenna which balances
the real one. More important, since very slight mechanical changes will spoil
a 60-db balance between two equal voltages, such bridge systems tend to be
highly microphonic."
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Microphonic error susceptibility does, in fact, exist in the
police radar set. This is easily demonstrated by striking a rod or
surface in the proximity of the instrument. The mechanical vibrations alone will cause the instrument to respond with corresponding miles per hour indications just as surely as to a moving target
vehicle within its radio range.
No further confirmation of this police radar design susceptibility to outside error sources is needed than the fact that the
manufacturer has supplied musicians' type tuning forks for making quick checks on the meter calibration. Struck so as to produce
only a barely perceptible hum or musical pitch, the tuning fork,
when held a short distance in front of the instrument, will produce actual observable velocity indications on the meter corresponding to 50 m.p.h. or other calibration value, depending on the
mechanical vibration frequency (not velocity as such), just as
truly as though a traffic vehicle were approaching at high speed.
Once this susceptibility (technically due to instrumental leakage
modulation) is established, the meter is known to be susceptible
to erratic indication since it responds to other sources than car
velocity. The closing of the police car door, adjustment of the
trunk lid, or the microphonism of the police radio, can send the
meter shooting up to velocities exceeding the speed limit.
Moreover, while a doppler design might ordinarily be arranged
to filter out very low and very high extraneous modulation frequencies, any modulation at a frequency corresponding to the doppler frequency of the moving targets for which the system is designed cannot be filtered out without removing the desired target
signal also. 1
Since the police instrument is required to cover a velocity
range of zero to 100 m.p.h., it must remain responsive over the
corresponding frequency range, so low frequency sources of di'turbance from at least 0 to 731 cycles per second, as well as high
frequency disturbances having any harmonic or modulation acceptance by the input circuit cannot be excluded from the system.
Amplitude modulation of the direct leakage signal from transmitter to receiver may be caused by power-supply hum, microphonics, fluctuation noise, intermittent contacts, etc. Barlow 12
computes that in a typical doppler system the modulation coefficient of the leakage carrier should be held to less than 4 parts in
one million, and notes:
This is an extremely difficult requirement to meet
and necessitates extreme care in eliminating hum and
microphonics. Voltage-regulated power supplies, shockmounting, and acoustic shielding are needed. Care must
be taken with the cooling of the transmitter output tube
u"Doppler Radar" by Edward J. Barlow, Sperry Gyroscope Company, Pro-

ceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers, April, 1949, Page 352.
u Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers, April, 1949.
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to prevent an impinging air or water blast from introducing microphonics in the output.
The tube replacement problem in police radar sets, caused by
overheating, has already been cited. Moreover, the police instrument exhibited in the Denver trials had no acoustic shielding and
no anti-microphonism type of shock-mounting. While the instruction book indicated a tripod was initially available, which allowed
the instrument to be set up outside the police car, such a tripod
was not being used by the police, and mounting in the car made
the instrument susceptible to vehicular vibrations. With respect
to power supply, it is noted that the Operating and Maintenance
Instruction Manual itself, under Paragraph 8, Calibration and
Test states:
Tube V208 in the output circuit relies on the balanced
operation of its two sections for zero stability with respect
to power input. The test for zero stability is made by
varying the input line voltage between the limits of 105
and 125 volts. A tube should be selected which has less
than 2 m.p.h. change of the zero reading over this range
of input line voltage.
Thus, a leeway of 2 m.p.h. is accountable in this one tube
alone with varying line supply voltage. The error leeway when
operated from a continuously draining battery supply is not
stated.
Another limiting factor of design in doppler radar instruments of the police type is receiver crystal noise, which noise
operates to limit the signal sensitivity. This crystal noise increases
with decreasing frequency and is enormous compared to thermal
noise for audio frequencies, which includes the doppler frequency
range from 0 to 731 cycles per second. To avoid this excess noise,
normal good design practice is to introduce a local oscillator and
amplify the signal at some normal intermediate frequency, 30
Mc/sec for example.
At this higher frequency the excess noise
13
is made negligible.
The police instrument uses such a receiver crystal, but does
not use a local oscillator to reduce the noise from the enormous
proportion that occurs at low frequency. To obtain a quantitative
indication of what this noise increase will be, we note that measurements made at the University of Pennsylvania, of the noise
temperature in the video- and audio-frequency range, show that
the noise temperature of a crystal converter increases as 1/f in
the doppler range.1 4 Taking the ratio of the cited 30 Mc (30 million cycles), where a local oscillator would be provided, to 219 cps
(the latter being the doppler frequency corresponding to 30 miles
per hour), by way of example, we obtain a ratio of possible in" R.S.E., Page 133.
14

Radiation Laboratory Series, Vol. 16, "Microwave Mixers," Page 95.
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crease in the crystal noise temperature of more than one hundred
thousand times, as a result of the design omission of the local ascillator in the police instrument.
D.-Propriety of Application
Let us turn to the propriety of application of the doppler radar
instrument in the police mode of use, both with regard to manufacturers' recommendations, and practices that have been adopted
by the police.
First, let us note that, within certain limits of approved application, we raise no question about the accuracy that can be
built into a doppler c-w radar system, any more than any other
radar system, where there is no limit to effort and expense to
overcome design deficiencies. Nevertheless, even then, it must be
recognized that many of the precise measurements that may be
cited for radar instruments, including doppler radar in military
fields of use, depend not only on optimum design but averaging
processes or highly complex mathematical computations applied
after reading the radar indication, in order to obtain the high order
of accuracy that may be credited to the instrument.
No such correction factors are applied to the police instrument because the instrument is not designed to register with such
accuracy that mathematical correction would be practical or significant. The instrument, to begin with, does not even have a manufacturer's represented accuracy under plus or minus 2 m.p.h.,
notwithstanding the fact that police do. not hesitate to read the
instrument to a precise miles per hour without any expressed
tolerance.
How does the police mode of application compare with authoritatively recognized limitations of radar? Radiation Laboratories
sources state:
Even the most advanced radar equipment can only
show the gross outlines of a large object, such as a ship
...Because of this grossness of radar vision, the objects
that can usefully be seen by radar are not as numerous
as the objects that can be distinguished by the eye. Radar
is at its best in dealing with isolated targets in a relatively featureless background, such as aircraft in the air,
ships on the open sea, island and coastlines, cities in a
plain, and the like. 15
The significance of this limitation of even the most advanced
radar becomes pointed when compared with police use wherein
radar patrol officers testify to using the recorded graph of the instrument to single out target vehicles traveling in common view
with other cars in multi-lane traffic on the arterials and city streets
-amid the most complicated and varying background of clutter
15R.S.E., Page 1.
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one could imagine. Using equipment compromised in design to
begin with, the police application is extended to areas not sanctioned in military equipment for the most advanced designs!
One commercial and military application of radar that has
been cited in court in support of the police instrument, because of
similar use of continuous wave (c-w) instead of pulse transmission,
is the radar altimeter used in airplanes. But, this is completely
invalid comparison because of the difference in conditions prevailing. In the case of the plane altimeter, there is but one target
below the plane, namely the earth, and there is no other object in
all the space between. This conforms to the proper conditions cited
by Reference 15. Moreover, observations are made 100 times per
second in typical
radar altimeters, to permit reduction of errors
1
by averaging.6
These are completely non-comparable circumstances to the
street or highway speed radar where the target motor vehicle may
typically lie in the same radar beam with utility poles, trees, sidewalk curbs, buildings, reflective pavements, and other vehicles,
both stationary and moving. Moreover, the target motor vehicle
not only has continually varying distance to the instrument but
also continuous change in aspect angle, which produces a different
velocity correspondence with each change of angle as the car
passes to the side of the instrument. The reading therefore constantly changes instead of gaining emphasis through coherence or
averaging of a relatively constant signal. This is so because the
police doppler set responds to a radial velocity measured along
lines between the target vehicle and the doppler instrument, off
to one side; whereas, the velocity of interest is the true velocity
of the car in its own direction down the street.
It is obvious from the above, and will be further established
later in this paper, that besides being deficient in design, some of
the fundamental areas in which police doppler radar cannot be
given free sanction in principle and physical law include the very
street situations in which they are being used. Accordingly, like
the lie detector, such instruments must be deemed questionable as
to admissibility as evidence. Since a trustworthy scientific basis
is not adequately established for the police doppler speed-check,
as presently constructed and operated, to otherwise justify the
admission of results, such checks are not substantive evidence of
anything. 17
However, there are many more points that disprove propriety
of application. Under cross-examination, a typical radar patrol
"6R.S.E., Page 132.
11CONTRA, People v. Kitz, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 8 (1954); People v. Sarver, 129
N.Y.S. 2d 9 (1954); People v. Buck, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 354 (1954); State v. Dantonio,
105 A. 2d 918 (1954). But none of these cases is a Supreme Court decision, and
in none of them was the evidence presented as herein outlined. All of them hold
that such evidence, although admissible (provided the proper foundational requirements are met) is not conclusive, and the jury must determine its weight.
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officer, fortified by his meager knowledge of radar, testified unequivocally that it is common practice to use the police radar set
in multi-car and multi-lane traffic, and that offending cars traveling in groups of three are unerringly picked out! This would require, through a species of mental process, almost instantaneous
interpretations of recorded graphs to reach such deductions in
time to warn the arresting officer, read and assign license numbers
to different inflections on a common graph recording, and to ascribe accurate identification of the particular offending car-all
predicated on the instrument's ability to even make such distinction. At 40 m.p.h., a car enters and leaves the effective radar beam
in the space of about 2 seconds.
Obviously, to establish such distinction of cars without question, in a very short time, requires that such instrument perform
not only with almost absolute integrity, but that the governing
principles allow such capability in the manner of application. This
is, of course, if the stimuli-response processes of the officer himself are also at the same time operating with unerring efficiency.
Not even the instruction manual for such instruments gives
unequivocal support to the radar officer's claimed ability to interpret the instrument record. Under the heading Operation, it is
stated:
When there are a group of vehicles within the operating range, and speed meter reads the speed of only
one vehicle at a time. Among the factors determining the
selection of a particular vehicle are its speed, target area,
and nearness to the transmitter-receiver. In single lane
approaches, the speed meter will ordinarily read the
nearest vehicle. However, on a multi-lane highway,
where a vehicle on one lane is traveling appreciably faster
and passing a vehicle in an adjacent lane, this faster vehicle will be read on the meter, and also can be easily
identified by the observer. The increased sensitivity to
higher speeds is due to the speed meter being designed
with a larger zone of operation for higher speed vehicles
than for lower speeds. The stated range of the unit actually corresponds to speed of 40 to 50 miles per hour.
The operating zone is made sufficient for the needle of the
indicator to reach its full value. (Emphasis ours)
Even this partial instruction book sanction to the aforesaid
practices states that in single lane approaches the speed meter will
only ordinarily read the nearest vehicle; because the selection of
the offending car also depends on speed, target area, zone of operation, and whether or not the speed is in the range of 40 to 60
miles per hour. Since the word ordinarily carries its own refutation as to constancy, it is an admission the speed meter does NOT
always read the nearest vehicle. Actually, as will be shown later
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in this paper, the instruction book statement also does not adequately limit the true capabilities of the instrument.
Radar itself, even in its most efficient military application, is
challengeable. The essentiality of complete integrity of instrument
performance simply does not exist, such that any human can be
unerringly certain of his deductions therefrom. Even if Courts
should overlook the limitations of human capabilities in such situations, the principles of radar science show that outside influences
(unless removed under rigidly controlled situations) dominate
weaknesses in radar principles and cause erratic responses. Such
weaknesses of radar are in fact exploited in the military science
called Radar Countermeasures, whose primary objective is to
cause enemy radar units to respond erratically.
E.-The Achilles' Heel of Radar
"The Achilles' Heel of Radar""' is a point of fundamental
weakness in the radar principle. This weakness is manifest in the
fact that the reflected "echo" energy coming back from a target is
so small a fraction of the directly transmitted radar wave, that a
host of extraneous outside sources of energy impinging directly
(not as an echo) upon the radar receiver, may easily exceed the
small radar "echo" energy corresponding to the intended target.
Associated with this echo sensitivity weakness is the fact that
such instruments cannot distinguish the nature of small targets.
One small object, capable of returning an echo, looks to the radar
just about the same as another. To a radar, an airplane or a ship
is a small object. It has been found that a number of thin metallic
strips, cut to a proportional length to the wave length used by a
radar, can return a remarkedly strong echo to that equipment. 9
To fully appreciate the significance of the outside influence
factor in the police instrument, it should be realized that the
maximum rated out-going signal power from a typical police instrument is only two-tenths of one watt; and that only a minute
fraction of even this small signal, measured in microvolts (millionths of 1 volt) comes back as the echo reflection from which the
velocity is derived.
This vulnerability to outside influences is inherent to basic
radar principles and can be alleviated only to limited degree by
express intricate design complication for each known source. In
civilian, as well as military use, outside noise influences may well
be capable of dominating the response under conditions when
there is not deliberate man-contrived exploitation, but only innocent noise or interference sources arising from common everyday
surroundings.
This basic vulnerability is acknowledged in the instruction
IsElectronics Warfare, Report on Radar Countermeasures, Joint Board on
Scientific Information Policy, Office of Scientific Research and Development,
United States Government Publication.
19Id.
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manual for the police radar instrument. This manual cites conditions causing erratic zero of the indicator, as follows:
1. Movement of objects such as tree limbs, etc., in the
field of the transmitter may produce enough signal to
prevent a clean zero. 2. Neon or fluorescent lights in the
field of the transmitter appear as moving targets, and
may produce an unsteady zero. 3. A worn or hashy vibrator (K301) in the power supply may generate noise
in the equipment or cause shifts of 2 or 3 m.p.h in the
instrument zero. 4. In some cases the output of the 2C40
tube (V-101) may increase after the unit has been used
for a few months. This condition causes too close coupling of the transmitter cavity to the transmitter antenna
and appears as excess noise which may indicate on the
meter.
It might be inferred from these instructions that disturbance
may occur only near zero indication. This would be an erroneous
assumption, however. The zero point merely happens to be the
only point where the indication may be checked directly.
Nor does checking at zero give any assurance that the instrument is not susceptible to error from the same causes at a higher
velocity indication. For, a direct correspondence does not exist to
assure corresponding correction at higher traffic velocities where
the instrument is more sensitive! The manual states: "The increased sensitivity to higher speeds is due to the speed meter being designed with a larger zone of operation for higher speed
vehicles than for lower speeds. The stated range of the unit actually corresponds to speeds of 40 to 50 miles per hour." Also,
under Theory of Operation it is stated that the circuitry is designed to prevent operation until a reasonable signal level is
reached. Therefore, the extraneous noise sources may never be
manifest at zero, but only at a higher velocity indication when the
indicator is activated by a passing vehicle, or when the noise corresponds to higher and more sensitive velocity registration.
Likewise, the possible noise error is not restricted to so little
as 2 or 3 m.p.h. For, the responsivity of the instrument to velocity
is not primarily due to strength of returned signal, but rather to
the frequency of signal from whatever source that is sufficiently
strong to actuate the instrument. Extraneous noise can just as
easily have a frequency correspondence to 50 m.p.h. as to 2 m.p.h.
-more so, in fact, because the instrument is more sensitive to frequencies corresponding to the higher traffic velocities. Indeea,
under the instrument's own theory of operation, a velocity of 1
m.p.h. will be derived for each 7.31 cycles per second of doppler
frequency. This means that 60 cycle disturbances would correspond to 8.2 m.p.h. Noises arising from various other sources
may have frequency correspondence up to the full 100 m.p.h indication of the instrument and cause velocity errors of 100% or
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more. Yet, for a given tire inflation, a speedometer can be set and
guaranteed to accuracy within 3 % or better.
Who can know, except under controlled conditions for any
given traffic situation, whether the speed indication was due
solely to the returned signal from the target vehicle, or extraneowR
noises, or a combination of both? The factor of sensitivity to noise
factors, particularly at higher velocity correspondence, makes it
highly questionable whether any expert may properly testify in
Court that, because his check of the instrument might have showed
it to be reasonbaly accurate under certain test circumstances, it
also accurately read the speed of the motorist at the time and circumstances in issue and NOT a velocity indication boosted by other
causes.
Like the tuning fork, the simultaneous operation of the police
radio during the speed check can cause an instrumental velocity
indication without ever a car passing. Under cross-examination,
radar patrol officers acknowledged this to be a fact. Independent
tests established that this indication could be 45 m.p.h., or virtually
any velocity, depending on the microphonic conditions of the radio.
In spite of this fact, standard operating procedure is for the
operator of the radar car to transmit observed speed information
by radio to another officer in an interceptor car up the street,
who makes the arrest-and, note, not on what the arresting officer
has himself observed, but on information radioed to him by the
radar officer whose radio at the same moment of the transmission
of such intelligence may have contributed to or caused the velocity
indication of the "offending" target vehicle.
Besides the matter of instrumental error involved, this manner of operation not only again brings up the serious problem of
hearsay, based on possible and probable misinterpretation of the
true cause of velocity indication, but a peak speed indication obtained in a fraction of a second, is not necessarily an indication
of the sustained careless Or willful speeding which the traffic ordinances contemplate.
Even the shaking of a pocket ring of keys in relative proximate view of the instrument can cause recordings of, say 40 m.p.h.
without ever the necessity of a reflected echo from a vehicle. The
less the range from instrument to noise source, the less need be the
power of the noise to over-ride or affect the very small signal echo
from a vehicle, other conditions being equal. In this connection,
let us bear in mind that the radar beam, shaped like a dew drop,
is not confined within the specific area of a single target vehicle,
but embraces an area extending from the instrument to sidewalks
and other lanes of travel.
The police instrument is claimed to be effectiv'e within a cone
of approximately 200 throughout a range of 175 feet. This range
is based on the expectancy of an adequately strong reflected signal
from the target vehicle's surfaces. But, extraneous noise sources
-replete in city streets-may operate not only in the area of the
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beam, but from greater distances where, with the greater power
radiated by commercial stations or amateur transmitters (for example) they may be capable of actuating the radar instrument.
In none of the previous cases reported, nor in the case tried
in Denver, was any testimony presented to prove that in selecting
the speed-trap location, as part of a check-up of instrument accuracy, the police made any attempt to exclude such extraneous
influences.
By way of illustration of the mechanism or error introduction,
the instrument may be in the process of recording the velocity of
a target vehicle at a distance of 150 feet, while noise emanating
from a slow-speed jalopy within 10 feet of the radar car, or noise
from microphonism in the radar car itself, or interference from a
transmitter not far from the radar trap, may, in fact, be partially
or wholly responsible for the maximum velocity recorded. Requiring the composite additional reflected energy from the vehicle to
trigger the instrument above normal zero indication, the recorded
graph could rise from zero with the approach of the vehicle and
have all the attributes of a normal curve while, in fact, influenced
by the extraneous noise source.
F.-The Radar Equation Factors
It should be observed at this point that for an expert to properly evaluate the police instrument and understand the radar principle involved he should know, not only the mathematics, but, also,
the significance of The Radar Equation. Otherwise, like the radar
police officer, it would be like qualifying the nurse that took the
x-rays to testify thereon in place of the doctor.
The reflected radar energy is not determined merely by physical area of the target, but by the effective area and many other
factors. 2 Like light waves, very short radar waves are not reflected evenly from curved and irregular surfaces. Most of the
energy is reflected at glancing angles in hemispherical directions,
with only small portions of energy reflected squarely back into the
little box-like instrument from which they were transmitted. Even
among the rays that are reflected in the right direction, interference takes place because of different distances traveled. Further
complication takes place because of the fact that some rays travel
directly to the target, in this case the automobile, while other rays
follow reflected paths from the pavement.
Under these conditions of extremely weak and varying echo
signal, seemingly insignificant objects may become major sources
of instrument response. In much the same way that a metal rod
constituting a car radio aerial is a better receptor than the whole
surface of a car, so also a resonant rod only about 21/2 inches long
corresponds to a half-wave length at the transmitter frequency of
2455 Mc for this radar instrument. There are many possible vibrat"RS.E., Pages 18-22.
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ing accessories which could be resonant or inordinately responsive
in their influence on the meter. Radio antennas and tire chains
are examples.
The example of a car wheel, say a spoked wheel, will illustrate the complexity of the situation. It is a principle of mechanics
that the top of a rolling wheel travels at twice the velocity as the
axle which corresponds to the forward vehicular speed. The bottom of a wheel momentarily has zero velocity, but lies in an insensitive part of the beam. The succession of flashing spokes at
the top region of the wheel, enhanced by being at the approximate
height of beam center and passing through angles of perfect reflection as the car approaches the radar set, can become excellent
radar signal reflectors. Now, remembering the radar instrument
manual's statement that the instrument has greater sensitivity to
higher velocities, we see that under certain conditions of reflection
the higher speed of the upper wheel surfaces can produce a velocity
indication in excess of the automobile's true forward speed. Indeed, since the top of the wheel does, in fact, travel at twice the
linear velocity of the car itself, one might properly question the
radar's accuracy if it failed to read the higher velocity.
The fact that an automobile has many flat surfaces, some of
which might be assumed surely to be square with the radar antenna, does not necessarily decide the issue. This is affirmed by
Reference 21 which states under the heading Properties of Radar
Targets:
Strong specular reflection will result whenever a flat
surface happens to be oriented normal to the line of
sight; yet the mere presence of flat surfaces is not enough
to guarantee a strong reflection. If these surfaces were
oriented in random directions, the probability of finding
one at just the right orientation would be so low that the
average signal from such a group of flat surfaces would
be no stronger than the average signal from a collection
21
of isotropic scatterers filling about the same volume.
While no analyses of actual reflection conditions off the complex contours of an automobile are known to have been made, in
the thorough manner in which aircraft have been studied, authorities have shown the extreme variation of reflected energy with
change of aspect angle of airplane surfaces, not unlike those of
an automobile. Reflected energy was found to vary as much as
3000 times in power as the aspect angle was changed, with changes
31 times) for changes as little as 1/
of as much as 15 db (about
22 degree in aspect angle.
A car is an equally complex target, with wheels, fenders,
curved and sharp surfaces, aerials, and other accessories; and the
21

R.S.E., Chapter 3, Pages 100-101.
Pages 21 and 75-81.

-"
Id.,
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aspect angle relative to the police instrument is necessarily constantly changing because motorists pass to the side from front to
back or vice versa, not precisely toward or away from the radar
instrument.
Bearing in mind the words of the Denver trials' judge who
stated that if just one person were convicted unjustly by the evidence of the police instrument, that would be one too many, the
question any fair appraiser of the equipment should like to have
answered is: How great must noise be to dominate the velocity
reading, and how can one know when an accurate reading is rendered ?
Our best hope of answer to this question would come from a
highly involved computation using all the factors of The Radar
Equation. Unfortunately, as applied to the c-w type of radar used
in the police instrument, the necessary information to 2fuliy determine this question is not completely known to science.
The difficult nature of the signal versus noise indication is
authoritatively discussed in References 24 and 25, and the belownoted quotations should be read for an appreciation of this problem. The reader of these statements could scarcely give credence
to any "expert" witness who glibly testifies that an equipment is
"accurate" without benefit of scientific data.
Under the circumstances of authoritatively stated limitations
of known knowledge of c-w radar signal-to-noise relationships,
there is, indeed, much greater justification for challenging any
claimed accuracy for the instrument, whatever the figure, than
to vlace the burden of 'proof that the instrument is in error on
the motorist.
G.-Identification of Multiple Targets
Let us now look at some further limitations of the police instrument, which cannot be disregarded in application. Possessing
only a single beam-width antenna, there is nothing in the radar
R.S.E., Page 131.
21R.S.E., Page 35, under the heading The Statistical Problem: "Let us summarize what we do know, once we are provided with the overall noise figure,
and band width of the receiver, the transmitted power, and the geometrical
factors in the radar equation which concern the antenna and the target. We
know the ratio of the amplified signal power to the average value of the amplified noise power. We are not yet able to say how large this ratio must be before
the signal can be identified with reasonable certainty. The root of the difficulty
is that we have to do with a statistical problem, a game of chance. The answers
must be given as probabilities, and will depend upon many features of the system
by which the signal is presented to the observer, as well as upon the precise
description of the 'reasonable certainty' mentioned above." (Emphasis ours.)
"Id., Page 37. "One can never be absolutely sure that any observed peak
is not due to a chance noise fluctuation, and one cannot even say how probable
it is that the peak is not due to noise, unless one knows how probable it is,
a priori, that the peak is due to something else-namely, signal plus noise.
Knowledge of a priori probability of the presence of signal is possible in controlled experiments such as those described in Volume 24, Chapter 8." (See
also page 131, paragraph 3.)
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principles of the police instrument to distinguish one traffic lane
from another, and there is nothing in the graphical record of the
instrument recorder to identify either traffic lanes or separate
cars within lanes. Any such indication on the tape record presented
in Court is only as ascribed by the radar operator. When multiple
cars are in a common field of view, the instrument record is a,
composite curve affected to some degree by all the cars, and it is
malevolent for an officer to ascribe a velocity peak on this composite indication to any one of the cars involved. An officer may
think he is justified in doing this when he sees in the "steps" of
the curve a semblance to the order of entry of cars into the beam.
but the velocity measurement is invalid under this composite condition.
Moreover, in simple doppler radar of this type, no other
identifying information of the target is revealed by the instrument than radial velocity and even this cannot be resolved for
multiple target vehicles when there is no discriminating antenna
or separate indicator response channels in the instrument.
The characteristic indistinguishability of radar target information, alike for both c-w and pulse radar, is authoritatively discussed in Reference 26, as quoted below. As noted, when (as in
the police instrument) the radar beam is not considerably smaller
in cross section than the individual objects viewed, there can be
no identification or distinction of targets by shape or otherwise.
Keeping in mind the complicated nature of reflection we have
discussed herein, it is presumptuous, indeed, for a radar patrl
officer to interpret multiple inflections of radar graphs, and ascribe
these inflections to particular cars, all in the 2 seconds of time that
it takes cars to travel through the beam at 40 m.p.h., while at the
same time he must identify the target vehicle and its license number-and no instrument capability exists for resolving multiple
targets.
H.-Operation of Police Radar Sets
In operation, the police radar transmitter-receiver unit is set
up near the edge of the street. The set is mounted either in the
-"R.S.E., Page 126. "The reader may well ask whether a phenomenon has been
overlooked which could be used to distinguish some targets from others. There
appears to be no possibility for such a phenomenon in the elementary process of
reflection of electromagnetic waves from inhomogeneities in the medium through
which they travel. A returning wave is characterized by frequeiicy (including
phase), intensity, and polarization. If two targets within the radar beamfor example, a telephone pole and a stationary man-produce echoes similar in
the respects listed, they are utterly indistinguishable, as much as we might
prefer to label one clutter and the other the true target. Such echoes may very
well be identical in the respects listed since no significant difference exists
at these frequencies between the electromagnetic properties of a man and those
of a piece of wood. To put it another way, the dimension of 'color' is not available because the radar cross section of most objects varies in no systematic
way with frequency. Distinction by shape, on the other hand, is possible only
when the radar beam is considerably smaller in cross section than the object
viewed."
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trunk of the police car or on the left rear fender, directly facing
traffic approaching from the rear. A radio wave is sent out over an
area of almost the width of the street and for a distance of about
175 feet. As a target vehicle passes through that operating zone,
an indicated speed is read directly on the meter and graph. The
operator of the radar car observes the license number and make
of car and radios this information to a second car parked several
blocks or more ahead. The second car, often referred to as the
interceptor car, stops the motorist and issues a warning or ticket.
Since the radar officer sits in his car with his back to oncoming
traffic, he must perform the multiple function of operating and
watching both the graph and meter in front of him on the dash
board of his car and simultaneously observe oncoming cars through
the rear-view mirror. The license numbers of over 50 feet are
extremely difficult to read, and, moreover, appear backwards from
right to left in the mirror. By actual test, it takes more than five
seconds to read numbers in motion, for the ordinary individual
not trained to read backwards; whereas, the approaching vehicle
is typically in the beam only 2 seconds.
It is only after the motorist comes up from the rear into view
ahead of the radar car, after the instrument record has been made,
that the officer reverses his field of vision from mirror to direct
view of the now rear end of the passing car, that the license numbers appear in true sequence-if time and traffic even then permits
reading. If a second observer is used, sitting on the other side of
the car, he has an even more restricted view of traffic.
To comprehend the difficulty of this observation, one may well
test himself with reading from street side the license numbers of
any 40 m.p.h. or faster car passing from the rear, or from the front
for that matter, without having anything else to note than the
license numbers.
Actually, doppler radar theory (the police instrument kind of
radar) does not sanction such use of simple continuous wave doppler radar where multiple moving targets are involved.
The doppler system can handle only one target at
a time, or roughly one target per beam-width for a scanning system. By contrast, a high-resolution pulse system
has something like 1,000 separate range elements, and
hence can handle many targets per beam-width.27 (Emphasis ours)
That is, the police instrument is not the right kind of radar to
deal with conditions of multiple targets, such attributes belonging
to high-resolution pulse systems. Further, in the simple doppler
system, approaching and receding targets are indistinguishable,
27
insofar as both produce the same doppler frequency.
2' Doppler Radar, Proceedings, Institute of Radio Engineer (1949),

by Edward J. Barlow.

Page 345,
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The police instrument is not a scanning system, and the antenna has only one relatively broad beam-width, about 200 wide,
utterly unable to discriminate between targets in an area out to
the instrument range of 175 feet. All reflected radar energy from
the entire conical area of this beam joins energy from noise and
vibration sources, including that conveyed through microphonism
in directions outside the beam, and enters the instrument in unresolved catch-all packs of energy. Since the instrument must
remain responsive to all doppler frequencies corresponding to
velocities from 0 to 100 m.p.h., in accordance with its stated capabilities, it cannot select with positive discrimination any separate
velocities corresponding to different targets without having separate channels of registration.2 8 Merely providing for different sensitivity of response amid all the other conflicting factors affecting
the radar transmission is not enough.
Considering this lack of discrimination of targets in a view
200 wide and 175 feet long, let us ask what would be the reaction
of the public to use of such an instrument to single out the winner
of a horse race, for example, where comparable speeds are involved, and where a light beam of shorter wave length than radar
waves, impinging on a photoelectric cell, has been found deficient
to the extent that a photograph must be taken besides?
The police instrument is able to resolve no such identification
or target distinction in the whole field of view, and this is not the
type of radarwhich can separate targets by discrete measured differences in range and direction.. Such properties of resolution do
belong to some of the great military and airport systems we read
about; but, remember, the police instrument is not that kind of
radar.
I.-Accuracy of Calibration
There is another area in which direct testimony of police
radar patrol officers reveals use of their instrument beyond the
limits for which doppler radar laws give sanction. Officers testffy
in Court that the instrument indication is checked by having another patrol car drive by the radar car, and having the driver call
out the miles-per-hour reading of his speedometer as he passes by.
It is then asserted that if the radar reading checked the speedometer exactly, the radar instrument calibration is accepted as
accurate and placed in use to check other cars.
In addition to the serious departure of this method of calibration from radar laws, a serious problem of hearsay is apparent.
One Court held such testimony to be inadmissible hearsay,-for each
officer had no first-hand knowledge of what the other officer told
him. The radar officer knew only what he had heard. Since, if
radar evidence is to be admissible, the testimony of officers is re-'R.S.E., Page 159.
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quired as to the accuracy of the radar speed meter as part of the
city's case, a grave problem of proof is raised.2"
Unfortunately for the motorist, when the instrument calibration is established in the above-described manner, the instrument
will read excessively high when applied, not to a car passing almost
abreast of the instrument, like the police car, but to approaching
cars at distances of 125-175 feet down the street-which is the
range recommended by the instrument book as the nominal range
at which more typical instrument triggering of oncoming traffic
record occurs.
This disparity of calibration comes about through another
compromise in the police instrument; this time not a point in design,
but in the theory of operation itself. Doppler radar, unlike the
mapping type radars which show relationships between many
points at once, as derived from different indicated ranges and directions, is only able to show velocity of a target along a line toward
itself. Since the car passes not directly toward but at an angle
to the instrument, the measured and true velocity only become one
and the same when the instrument lies in the path of the moving
vehicle, which, on straight streets, would be the direction of a
head-on crash, and, therefore, not realizable.
The police instrument Operating and Maintenance Manual
recognizes this point, but deprecates its significance somewhat
arbitrarily, justifiable only under restricted circumstances of use.
Having cited the doppler frequency formula, the Manual, under
the heading, Theory of Operation, states:
The above formula is specifically true only when the
direction of movement of the target is in the same direetion
as the shortest distance between the Transmitter-Receiver
and target. An angle between the two directions requires
a cosine factor for the more general solution. The cosine
of the angle, less than 10 degrees, however, yields an
accuracy within 2% ; this factor can, therefore, be
dropped.
The arbitrary selection of a figure of 10 degrees here presumes
use of the instrument at a minimum distance of approximately
57 feet, when the instrument is placed at the 10 feet distance from
the edge of the road allowed by the Operating and Maintenance
Manual (i.e., tangent of 10/57 = 100).
Yet, under Operational and Electrical Characteristics, the
manual clearly states: "Operating Zone: Vehicle detection is effective within a cone of approximately 200 throughout a range of
175 feet." (Emphasis ours).
Both direct and cross-examination testimony of the police
radar patrol officers substantiated the fact that the instrument
is activated at ranjes of 25 to 175 feet. Use down to at least 25
SPeople v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 179.
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feet was also observed by an engineer witness, and testimony has
already been cited wherein radar patrol officers stated they checked
speedometer indications against the instrument as another police
car passed by.
At such lesser distance of 25 feet down the street, the disparity in angle when the instrument is placed 10 feet off the traffic
lane is not 10', corresponding to a 2% error, but is the tangent of
10/25, or approximately 220, the cosine error of which is 7.3%.
Actually, the degree of error is greater than that computed
because, as the Instruction Manual notes, the instrument is required to be set up no more than 10 feet "from the edge of the
road." It is well known that speeding vehicles, particularly in
multi-lane traffic, do not travel at the very edge of the road. The
difference angle and consequent velocity error could, therefoe,
be very much greater than that computed from an assumption of
only 10 feet to the vehicular line of travel. For a line-of-traffic
separation distance equal to down-the-street vehicular distance,
the indicated radial velocity of the instrument would differ from
the true velocity of the vehicle by the cosine of 450, or an error
correspondence of 29.3%. This, along with all the many other
separate error sources cited, confutes the "popularly" held notion,
as expressed by a Justice of the Peace, sitting in the trial of an
offending motorist, that the instrument is only 2 miles per hour
'off'.
In another phase of testimony, in the Denver trials, a police
radar patrol officer testified that he "proved" the instrument's
ability to distinguish multiple targets by parking his radar car
along Santa Fe Road, about 50 feet from the railroad tracks, and
checked the speed of both a police car and the train, as viewed
simultaneously through vehicular traffic on the road. This officer
claimed exact correspondence between instrument reading and
the speed held by the engineer of the train.
Under this condition of 50 feet separation from the railroad
(which, incidentally, violates the Instruction Manual's admonishment under Section II that "The Transmitter-Receiver should be
located as close to the moving traffic as safety and convenience will
allow, in no case more than 10 feet from the edge of the road".),
a 10-degree difference angle to hold to 2% error would require
that the train be observed at a parallel road distance of 274 feet
(i.e., tangent 50/274 = 100), or, an actual diagonal distance of 288
feet to the train (i.e. sine 50/288 = 100).
Since the Operating and Maintenance Manual recommends
adjustment of the instrument to intercept traffic at a nominal maximum distance of 175 feet, the officer's "proof" by identical velocity
indications can mean only two things: (1) The calibration of the
radar instrument would have to be excessively high in order that
the cosine velocity component alone (to which the instrument responds) would equal the true velocity of the train, (at an angle
greater than the 100 limit ascribed by the Instrument Manual for
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2% error), and/or (2) The instrument must be sensitive to relative effective area of the target to a degree which, in typical traffic, could cause varying velocity response of the instrument according to the different angular distances at which different size
vehicles would actuate the instrument.
Agreement of speed readings when the instrument was so
much as 50 feet abreast from the train was therefore in reality
a confirmation of error in the instrument calibration, instead of
the "proof" of accuracy represented to the Court. For, the velocity
calibration would have to be more than 100% of true if the instrument's sensitivity to only the cosine component (which must
always be a fraction smaller than 1 at an angular displacement)
was itself equal to 100% of the train's reported true velocity.
This, in fact, complete reversal of the alleged "proof" points
out nakedly how utterly incompetent such testimony as the above
is, and the abuse of the rules of evidence when operations officers
are allowed to testify on technical matters.
Whether the disparity between the radar instrument's reading of radial velocity as compared with true velocity will under
other circumstances favor or weigh against the motorist, will depend entirely on the police calibration procedure. While nominally
the radial velocity must be less than the true velocity, arbitrary
procedure of establishing instrument calibration in a short distance or wide angle test, and then using this reading to check
motorists at the lesser angle of maximum approach distance will
assuredly result in an increase over 100% of true velocity being
ascribed to the motorist, by an amount proportional to the difference in cosines of the two different angles of test and application.
For the same reason, a very large bus or van, to which the
instrument is sensitive at greater distances, will be "seen" at
greater distances (corresponding to more nearly parallel angles)
and will tend to show higher velocities than police vehicles checked
at closer range; whereas, smaller sport cars (perhaps most likely
to be speeding), presenting lesser reflective surfaces, will tend not
to "trigger" the instrument until shorter distances are reached
where the sharper angles to the side result in a lower cosine component of velocity being indicated by the instrument.
We see, therefore, that the instrument readings are subject
to still further sources of error by reason of arbitrary calibration
procedure.
J.-Reliability of the Claim by Radar Car Officers that they can
Correlate Visual Observations to Complex Instrument Records.
We have already cited authoritative theory explaining why
the police type instrument is not capable of separating multi-car
signal information, having as it does only a single fixed radar
beam and a single indicator channel. Likewise, claims of separation by reason of varying sensitivity are not valid in an instrument which must remain sensitive over a 0 to 100 m.p.h. range,
and affected by multitudinous other sensitivity factors such as

DICTA

Sept.-Oct., 1955

nearness, effective area, zone of operation, and wave cancellation
by reflections and interference.
So, also invalid is the claim by the operating officers that they
may directly correlate their visual observations with the instrument record, to establish further interpretation of instrument
record than that contemplated in instrument theory and design.
The fallacy of this notion is supported by the Operating and Maintenance Manual itself. Under the heading Theory of Operation,
it is explained that the meter actuating circuit depends on a tube
which is prevented from operating until a "reasonable" signal
reaches its grid. Then, as the signal increases in magnitude the
preceding stages operate as limiters. It is further stated that in
order to suppress some signals and to take care of decreases in
signal amplitude which might cause the meter to lose its reading
for an instant, an automatic expander is incorporated in the circuit.
Clamping action is also involved, working off the output tube.
Such design was obviously intended to produce clean, readable graphs, instead of showing all the effects of signal variation.
But, can even a layman read through the cited use of signal prevention circuits, limiters, suppressed signals, expander action, and
clamping action without failing to appreciate that the output
signal to the meter is not linear with the input signal to which the
instrument responds? Without a direct or one-to-one correspondence between input and output, it is impossible to correlate the
external physical occurrence with the instrument output record
except as an intricate scientific problem in which one would be
required to know, among other things, the precise signal levels at
which all the various clamping, limiter, and expander circuits were
designed to "trigger" and operate.
As a point of fact, the arbitrary use of limiters and volume
expander, to over-ride the true doppler signal tendency of the
velocity meter to follow a cosine-law of response as the radial
component of velocity changes, creates a delusion in the operator
of thinking he is seeing a true velocity record instead of the radial
velocity to which doppler radar really responds. The testimony
of officers in the Denver trials showed they were so deluded. If
the instrument output truly corresponded to the input signal obtained from a vehicle traveling at constant speed in a straightline course past the instrument, the recorded velocity should not
be similarly constant because the actuating velocity is only the
cosine component of the true velocity; this component velocity
decreases as the angle to the vehicle becomes greater until, When
the car passes at right angles or 90', the actuating velocity is, in
fact, zero. Hence, the delusion when circuitry is devJsed to artificially sustain and record a velocity indication at a level not corresponding to the velocity being derived by the radar beam at
that time.
Even a skilled radar engineer could not fully interpret the
graphical record to correlate all possible traffic movements from
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one moment to the next, beyond the limits (1) cited in doppler
radar theory, and (2) as established by intricate laboratory controlled tests of the precise signal levels at which the suppression,
expansion, clamp, and other circuits are triggered or activated in
an instrument of particular design.
When a Court expert witness sought, by direct request to the
instrument manufacturer, radar test data of a type which would
permit instrument evaluation, including the various circuit signal
thresholds and the basis used for establishing the instruction book
stated accuracy figure of plus or minus 2 m.p.h., his request was
denied. How, then, can the presumptuous interpretations of a
radar car officer, interpreting the manifold graph inflections of
multiple-car situations "seen" by a single catch-all radar beam,
possibly be regarded as admissible evidence in Court?
We conclude this part of this presentation by asking these
fundamental questions: Who does affirm that any and all of the
multifarious factors capable of influencing radar accuracy to
indeterminate degrees may be arbitrarily neglected in establishing
the plus or minus 2 m.p.h. accuracy claimed for the police instrument?
Who affirms what the characteristic response of the instrument will be under the different conditions of sensitivity and expander circuit adjustments made accessible to non-scientific personnel in the instrument?
Who ventures to affix even the probability of receiving signal
unaffected by noise under all the conditions of traffic use and uncontrollable surroundings, in the face of all the cited authority
that says this is not possible except in fully controlled circumstances of laboratory test?
By letters under dates of January 6, 1955, and June 7, 1955,
respectively, both the United States Bureau of Standards and the
Federal Communications Commission, state that neither agency
has been requested to conduct detailed study of the so-called
"radar" speed meters. Thus, as of this writing, there seems to
be no government agency or recognized technological institution
that has determined the standards of performance and operation
that shall be observed in such instruments. It goes without saying
that in the absence thereof, legislative sanction for checks on speed
by use of "radar" devices, and making such checks prima facie
evidence of speed, is not only improper but certainly subversive
of established and long-tested rules of evidence.
II.-ADMISSIBILITY OF RADAR SPEED CHECKS
It will be recalled that Jones was convicted of speeding on the
sole evidence as shown by the indicator graph. It was objected to
on the ground that no trustworthy scientific basis had been established for the particular speed check made under the unique
and uncontrolled conditions existing at the time to justify the admission of such check as substantive evidence of anything. This
was overruled.
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In State v. Moffitt30 over a similar objection, the Court allowed the question to go to the jury with this instruction:
In the present case, however, before you can return
a verdict of guilty under this contention-that is, a finding by reason only of the speed meter-you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the speed meter used
in the present case was functioning properly, was properly
operated at the time, and was in fact, an accurate recorder of speed; further, that its accuracy had been properly tested within a reasonable time from the date of its
use, January 6, 1953.
If these essentials are found by you to exist, you
may determine that the Speed Meter recorded the accurate speed of the defendant's vehicle at the time of
the test on January 6, 1953, and such finding standing
alone, if made by you, would furnish sufficient evidence
for the conviction of the defendant in the present case.
While we do not disagree with the instruction, we challenge
the sufficiency of the radar facts presented in this case in view of
what we outlined above respecting the variables, imponderables,
uncertainties, and questionable design of the radar instrument.
Without those facts, how can a jury of laymen possibly arrive at
a fair verdict?
This problem of sufficiency, related to admissibility, was,
however, recognized in People v. Offerman, 31 wherein the defendant had been convicted in the City Court of speeding, based on
evidence shown only by the radar speed meter. The judgment of
conviction was reversed upon appeal on the ground that the accuracy and reliability of the device had not been shown by proper
and competent evidence. In remanding the case for re-trial, the
Appellate Court said:
Law enforcement should keep in stride with the
advances of science, and Courts should receive scientific
proof when presented in accordance with the established rules of evidence. These rules have safeguarded
our lives, our freedoms, and our property since the establishment of the common law, and should not be lightly
set aside in the name of convenience. It may be that
these electronic devices will become a great and muchneeded weapon in the. armory of law enforcement . , *
In the not too distant future this science may bring civilization the horrors of a push-button war, but it must
not bring push-button justice unless and except such
justice is surrounded by the long-established rule of
evidence.
A. 2d 778 (1953).
,1125 N.Y.S. 2d 179.
3100
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This latter decision recognizes also the problem of scientific
dependability, which we have outlined above, about radar speed
meters. The fact that the defendant in the Offerman case, upon
retrial, was again convicted, and that the same result was obtained in People v. Torpey,"2 follow from the practically total lack
of evidence on the limitations of radar, as prevailed in the Moffitt
case, supra, allowing the prosecution in all three cases a field day.
In all three of the aforementioned cases, the city relied on an
expert's opinion. In none of these cases did the defense have
experts evaluate not only the manufacturer's claims for radar
speed meters, but a scientific analyses of the whole situation. It
is obvious that where only the "bright" side of the picture is
presented and the "dark" side is not presented, considering the
complexity of radar principles and application, ordinary jurymen
are bound to be persuaded by the still-existing mystery surrounding the name "radar". It should be clear, too, that an expert's
opinion on what actually occurs at the time the speed checks are
made must be based necessarily on the assumption that all variables and idiosyncracies of radar were under control at the time
and place of the speed check, and the instrument was influenced
only by the return echo from the target vehicle. Indeed, such assumption and such speed check, as we pointed out above, should
have no efficacy whatever unless the factors of radar limitations
are properly explained for each and every traffic violation tried on
the basis of only radar evidence.
On this point of admissibility, the few representative cases
cited herein, seem to stand for the proposition that the results of
radar speed tests are admissible if the proper foundational requirements are met, and these seem to be limited to a radar expert's opinion; and this, without any showing of compliance with
competently pre-determined standards of performance and operation that shall be observed in the design and operation of radar
speed meters at the time of the alleged violation.
III.-THE PROBLEM OF ENTRAPMENT
Most popular references, mainly newspapers, refer to the
radar speed check as "Radar Trap." No human likes to be trapped,
however laudable the purpose. Entrapment under special circumstances may be a defense to criminal prosecution. With such an
attitude by the public against speed traps, a serious problem of
"relations" between the police and public is raised. If the police
are to be regarded as the true guardians of the law and the servants
of the people whom they shall protect, this problem of entrapment
should receive serious attention. To assert "that radar traps are
aids to law enforcement and assist in curbing senseless slaughter
of human beings on our highways and streets," as justification for
the means employed, is to misapprehend the damage those means
can do. Who can doubt the wisdom that actively patrolling the
128 N.Y.S. 2d 564.
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streets is the tested and best way of preventing unlawful speeding,
and that prevention of crime is far better
than apprehension after
3
the preventable crime has taken place!
California, Oregon, and Washington have adopted statutes
34
prohibiting the use of speed traps, in response to public demand.
On the other hand, the states of Virginia and Maryland have
adopted statutes governing the use of radar for traffic control.3 5
If radar speed traps must be used, to prevent the development
of bitterness and anti-social feelings, legislative sanction first
should be obtained and such legislation should lay down the
standards of performance and operation for radar speed checks.
Moreover, the fact that the police in the exercise of discretion
will not arrest speedsters whose radar indications do not exceed the
speed limitations by 7 to 12 miles, to allow for error, is, in fact,
a specie of "Discriminatory Legislation" giving rise to the question of who in our coordinate branches of government, should decide that a 30 m.p.h. speed ordinance really means 37 m.p.h.? This
raises the serious question of due process of law under which an
ordinance must be sufficiently explicit in its description of the
offending acts and related to an ascertainablestandard of guilt.
Such legislation, suggested to overcome these criticisms, presumes the will of the people reflects itself therein, and, when enacted, it is. the people themselves who sanction the use of speed
traps and hence, because such legislation may be repealed, should
not be heard to complain. Surely this is the better policy under our
system of government, than for an executive agency, like the
Police Department, exercising authority under the police power,
to usurp legislative authority and even invade the province of the
Courts, no matter how well intentioned, by the arbitrary adoption
of said radar instrument in the absence of definite legislatively
sanctioned standards of design and operation, including a statute
making proof of certain facts prima facie evidence without affecting the ultimate burden of proof.
IV.-THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
Obviously in the present state of radar speed devices judicial
"Fleming v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 344, 238 Pac. 88.
"Cal. Vehicle Code, Sec. 751 (1948); Cal. Vehicle Code, Sec. 752 (Supp.
1953); Ore. Rev. Stat., Sec. 483.112 (1953); Wash. Traffic Code, R.C.W. 46.48.120
(1937). In respect to the Wash. Statute, the Attorney General of that state is
of the opinion that the statute is designed to apply to a situation where there is
a measured course, a lapsed time clocked by an officer, and a computation of
speed. The Attorney General felt that the Legislature had considered the elimination of human error in such situations by taking notice of the fact for example, that a car traveling at 50 rn.p.h., over a course 600 feet in length wili
cover that distance in 8 seconds; and that a lag of 1 second in human perception will result in an error of 6 m.p.h., therefore the wording of the statute does
not prohibit the use of radar traps because with a "radar" device there is no
possibility of human error, and consequently radar evidence is admissible.
"' MD. AN,.x. CODE, Gen. Laws, Art. 35, Sec. 99 (Supp. 1954); VAx. CODI:, Sec.
46-215.2 (Supp. 1954).
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notice of their accuracy cannot be expected. Proper foundational
requirements must be met first as a condition precedent to the
admission of such evidence. Moreover, if admissible at all, the
weight of such proof is a question for the jury to determine, the
same as any other evidence. All of the reported cases seem to hold
this view.
In the case of People v. Torpey "6 the Court stated:
No expert testimony was offered on the part of the
people to establish the fact that the so-called radar equipment is a mechanism that correctly and accurately records the speed of passing automobiles. The use of radar
is comparatively new as a means of bringing about the
arrest of violators of ordinances pertaining to the speed
of automobiles, and until such time as the Courts recognize radar equipment as a method of accurately measuring the speed of automobiles, in those cases in which the
people rely solely upon the speed indicator and the radar
equipment, it will be necessary to establish, by expert
accuracy of radar for the purpose of meastestimony, the
37
uring speed.
In another case, People v. Beck, 38 the Court refused to admit
that the accuracy of radar was so generally known that a court
of justice should take judicial notice thereof and reversed the
conviction of the defendant against whom the evidence consisted
partly of a radar speed meter results and partly of eye-witness
testimony as to speed. The Court held that the eye-witness testimony was admissible, but that the radar testimony was not admissible unless supported by expert testimony. And because it did
not appear from the record that the defendant was convicted solely
on the basis of admissible evidence, the case was reversed and
remanded.
In the only other case, aside from the Denver trials, wherein
the defendant attempted to prove the inaccuracy of the radar speed
meter, State v. Dantonio,3' 9 the New Jersey Court heard the testimony of both radar and tachograph experts. The radar expert
testified that all defects in the radar equipment resolve in favor
of the motorist! This was unchallenged. The radar officers testified they operated as a team of two-one in the radar car, and the
other in the interceptor car. The manner of testing and setting
up the equipment was the same as outlined previously in this article and the instrument was the same. But unlike State v. Moffitt,
N.Y.S. 2d 864 (1953).
315 MERCER L. REV. 322 (1954); wherein this view receives unqualified support by the observation "the modern mind has a tendency to pay homage to the
advancements of science by accepting, without question, hypothesis (sic) coming
even from the very frontier of research."
38130 N.Y.S. 2d 354 (1954).
"105 A. 2d 918 (1954).
.128
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supra, and People v. Offerman, supra, the police, in this case, produced and introduced in evidence, as part of the speeding proof,
the written record of the speed of the bus as made at the time of
the violation over a distance of 4614 miles. The defense countered
by introducing expert evidence on the accuracy of the tachograph
with which the bus was equipped. The evidence of this instrument
showed that the bus slightly exceeded the speed limit of 60 m.p.h.
But, in no part of the evidence in this case, and for that matter,
we repeat, in no other case reported, was the radar instrument and
the manner of its operation properly evaluated to disclose its
limitations in practical application.
So, in this battle of Radar v. Tachographthe issue was decided
upon rebuttal testimony produced by the state. And this is significant. The rebuttal evidence was given by a traffic engineer, who
testified "that the mileage from the toll booth at interchange No.
4 to mile post 80 1/2, the point where the radar equipment was set,
is 461/ miles." He proved mathematically that for the bus to have
travelled 461/4 miles-the bus must have been clocked and its time
checked both at the toll booth and when it passed the radar instrument-in approximately 40 minutes, it must have travelled at
an average speed of 66 m.p.h. Two facts should be noted here,
(1) it was the distance and time factors between the toll booth and
radar instrument, and (2) the indisputable mathematical computation which decided the issue-not either of the said instruments.
We observe that no judicial notice was taken of the accuracy
of either instrument. Also, this case stands for the proposition
that there is no adequate substitute, notwithstanding the miraculous claims made for radar and its short-circuiting affects in
Court, for the long-established practice of producing independent
corroborativetestimony. Since we have shown that the radar speed
instruments possess frailities not unlike in variety to those possessed by human witnesses, why should Courts and juries accord
its results unquestioned credibility, not accorded to uncorroborated
human witnesses?
We conclude this discussion on Judicial Notice with the pertinent observation and approval made by the New Jersey Court
of the Court's statement in People v. Offerman: 40
The legislature in its wisdom might see fit to declare
that the reading of an electrical timing device similar to
the one here may be admitted in evidence as prima facie
evidence of the speed of the automobile of an accused,
after such device has been certified as accurate by the
authority designated by the legislature. By such legislation, the People will be relieved of the burden of proving
the accuracy of the electrical timing device upon each
trial and by expert testimony. The traveling public will
be protected against convictions based upon the reading
125 N.Y.S. 2(N179; 204 Misc. 769.
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of an unproven and possibly inaccurate device, and of
equal importance, the rules of evidence will not be violated.
Since, therefore, judicial notice of the accuracy of radar speed
meters, if taken, would be cognizant of a fact deemed to be measured by general knowledge of the same fact,-" it would pervert the
truth, because such fact is not accepted without qualification or
contention.
V.-THE HEARSAY PROBLEM
Keeping in mind how the radar instruments are tested before
use, and the gap between the time and place of the radar check
and the "information" given to the radar expert (whose tests of
the instrument do not prove the conditions of the instrument),
likewise, the actual manner of operation at the time, nor less
definitely, the extraneous conditions prevailing at the time and
place of the radar check, we are confronted with a serious problem of hearsay. In the case of People v. Offerman, supra, the only
Court to discuss part of this problem, the Court held that the
testimony of the radar police officers regarding their so-called
checks for accuracy of the instrument was inadmissible hearsay.
The radar officer, even if the radar principles involved were not a
serious factor, had no precipient knowledge of what the other
officer told him. He knew actually only what one had heard.
The position of the expert is even more delicate. He has to
assume that the conditions prevailing when he tests the instrument were the identical conditions, as told to him, that prevailed
at the time and place of the actual radar speed check. He must
necessarily be confined to the evidence of facts in the case. And
remember those facts are testified to by precipient witnesses, radar
officers, who are not competent to accurately report the radar
factors that actually prevailed at the time and place of the speed
check. The expert's opinion based on such a foundation has no
better status. If the expert bases his opinion upon his personal
knowledge he must give the facts upon which it is based before
stating it.42 Since he is never on the spot at the time, this would
be impossible unless the hearsay rule is violated.
VI.- PROBLEM OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
In the states of Maryland and Virginia where they have statutes 43 under which to make out a prima facie case, the prosecution has a relatively simpler problem. Since such statutes as, for
example, the Virginia Code, provide that "The results of such
checks shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of the speed of
such motor vehicle in any court or legal proceedings where the
, 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sections 17-18.
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 794.
'MD.
AN.-N. CODE, Gen. Laws, Art. 35, Sec. 99 (Supp. 1954); V.%. Coi.. Sec.
46-215.2 (Supp. 1954).
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speed of the motor vehicle is at issue," all that need be proven
thereunder is that the arresting officer was in uniform at the time;
that speed signs were properly posted; that the radar mechanism
was properly functioning; that the defendant was the driver of the
car which was shown by the radar speed meter to have exceeded
the speed limits; that the information regarding the offending
car was immediately radioed to the interceptor officer who made
the arrest. While the ultimate burden of proof is not affected by
such statutes, they, nevertheless, make prima facie evidence of
speed the results of a mechanism which we have pointed out is extremely vulnerable to many factors. The principal weakness here
is that no standards of design and operation are laid down by the
legislature. This opens up a whole field of dispute. May the legislature enact a law affecting the rights of citizens in Court, which
law embraces intricate and complex scientific mechanisms, without
specifying minimum essentials of compliance of said instrument
to scientifically determined safeguards? Apparently it can, but is
it right?
It seems to us that such statutes as mentioned take the place
of judicial notice of the accuracy and reliability of such instrument. And we have seen that no appellate court has given such
judicial notice because the accuracy and reliability of such instrument must be proven like any other evidence sought to be introduced. Until such standards of design and operation are specifically embodied in the law, we believe the Courts are right in refusing to admit such evidence until the proper foundation has
been laid in each case. It is plainly obvious that radar facts and
principles are not of such generalized knowledge and so universally
known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. That
being so not only is such legislative notice, as referred to, improper,
but also otherwise a prima facie case is difficult to make, if not
impossible, in view of the present status of radar speed meters.
When the fact of radar speed check accuracy is explained and
contradicted, the foundations for a prima facie case in behalf of
the proponent of that fact are destroyed, and, if not, the issue thus
made must go to the jury for determination. Whether, therefore,
the proponent of unquestioned accuracy of such instruments produces prima facie evidence showing the existence of the fact of
accuracy and reliability as against the opposition's contradiction
thereof, and thereby makes out (notwithstanding the contradictory
facts) a prima facie case, depends on understanding of the scientific facts involved herein. And because a prima facie case is made
out only by proper and sufficient testimony
iii view of the scientific explanation herein given, we find that "radar" evidence alone,
without supporting admissible corroborative testimony, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.
4132

C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 1016.
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VII.-CONCLUSION
When we stop to consider (1) that "radar" has to do with
energy which travels at the speed of light, or 186,000 miles per
second, (2) that the activation of the instrument is in terms of
fractions of seconds, and (3) that human operators possess limitations in the speed with which they may accurately respond, giving
rise to all of the aforementioned imponderables, we cannot escape
from the thought of whether or not Police Departments and Justices of the Peace have grasped at this speed device, not so much
for laudable purposes, but for the more certain and greater number of "apprehensions" as a revenue measure!
This question cannot escape the thoughtful citizen when in
the course of 3 months' use in Denver 1,600 motorists were nipped
$20.00 each, or about $32,000.00! If, therefore, such devices are
used in all the arterial highways of a city, and if the speed ordinances must be interpreted to mean that a violation for only a
fraction of a second is sufficient for conviction, have we not through
a "scientific gadget" found a way to "tax" our citizens without
proper "representation" and, much worse, subvert the true purposes of our Courts?
It may very well be that the "experimenters" in the frontiers
of research will eventually produce a radar speed device that cannot be questioned, and no suggestion is herein made that the law
should drag behind the progress of science; but since the rights
of citizens are involved, the better policy to pursue is for the Courts
to resist the peddlers of electronics miracles and not allow "it [the
science of electronics] to bring push-button justice unless and except such justice is surrounded by the long-established rules of
evidence . . ." and, even then, not until "after such device has
been certified as accurate by authority designated by the legislature.' "45 (Emphasis ours)
People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 179.

RECENT OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF COLORADO
CITIES AND TOWNS
55-2777-February 7, 1955
REQUESTED BY: William Atha Mason, Attorney at Law Rifle,
Colorado
FACTS: Members of the board of trustees or city council frequently sell supplies to or perform labor or services for the
town while on the city council and charge the city for the
same.
QUESTION: Is it permissible for a member of the board of trustees or city council to sell supplies to or to perform labor or
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services for the city and charge the municipality for the same?
CONCLUSION: It is not permissible.
COLO. A & M COLLEGE-CITIES AND TOWNS-TAXATION
55-2767-January 6, 1955
REQUESTED BY: W. E. Morgan, President Colorado Agricultural and Mechanical College
FACTS: The City of Fort Collins desires to annex property owned
by the State of Colorado and used as the Colorado Agricultural and Mechanical College. The state-owned property is
contiguous to the Municipality.
QUESTIONS: 1. May the city annex state-owned land occupied
by a state institution?
2. If this property is annexed, would the state lose its sovereign rights and power or subject the college to municipal
taxation ?
3. Does the State Board of Agriculture have the power to
consent to the annexation, or will special legislation be required authorizing the board to consent to the annexation?
4. After annexation, would the college be subject to municipality building codes and zoning regulations?
5. Does the State Board of Agriculture possess the power to
contract with the City for special rates on public utilities?
CONCLUSIONS: 1. A municipality may annex state-owned land
used for purposes of a state institution.
2. After annexation, the City could not encroach upon the
sovereign rights or powers of the state, and the college property would be free from taxation.
3. The State Board of Agriculture has the authority to consent to the annexation, providing the fee simple title to the
state property is held by the Board. However, if the title is
in the name of the State, then only the State, by special legislation, may consent. to the annexation.
4. The City may not impose building and zoning regulations
on the college property. The State has vested the power and
duty to construct buildings and their type in the Board. However, should the college propose building in a zoned area, the
city zoning laws would control.
5. The State Board of Agriculture may contract with the City
for special rates on public utilities.
LEGISLATURE-CITIES AND TOWNS
55-2785-March 1. 1955
REQUESTED BY: William Bodan, Jr., City Attorney, Englewood, Colorado
QUESTION: Can a city councilman also hold office as a sta",
representative?
CONCLUSION: There is no prohibition against a state representative holding office as city councilman inasmuch as he was
elected to the latter office. See Carpenter v. People, 8 Colo.
116, 5 Pac. 828.
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THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933: "PRIVATE"
OR "PUBLIC" OFFERING
By IRVING M. MEHLER of the Colorado and New York 13uIrs

The question relating to the sale of securities to a given number of persons in interstate commerce by the incipient corporation
as well as by the corporation of repute and long standing has in a
great many instances placed the attorney and the client on the
horns of a dilemma. On the one hand we find the corporation in
dire need of immediate capital, and on the other hand we find the
attorney unable to state precisely the number of persons who may
be approached to purchase stock in the corporation without violating the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 ' pertaining to
the registration of securities.
It is basic that a corporation seeking to raise a sum in excess
of $300,000.00 through a public offering of securities in interstate
commerce must file a registration statement with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Should the corporation find that its
financial straits could be alleviated with an amount less than
$300,000.00, it could seek an exemption from registration under
the Revised Regulation A 2 upon compliance with the provisions
of that regulation. In any event, whether the corporation is seeking a sum in excess of $300,000.00 from the public or whether it
is seeking an amount under $300,000.00, compliance with the Act
or the regulation, as the case may be, becomes mandatory.
In view of the fact that in the particular instance under discussion the financial needs of the corporation are pressing and a
"public offering" under both the Act and the regulation is time
consuming, it is the aim of this paper to explore the question of
how many persons may be approached to buy stock in a corporation without the transaction being considered a "public offering"
and therefore exempt from registration. Or to put the question
in another way: When is a sale of the securities of a corporation
in interstate commerce to a given number of persons considered a
"private offering" and therefore exempt from registration?
I.

DEFINITIONS
Before attempting to solve the ultimate problem, it may aid
considerably to note how all-embracing some of the following basic
working terms are under the Securities Act of 1933:
(1) The term "security" means any note stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for
'48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77c.
215 U.S.C.. Sec. 77c(b) (1953).
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a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
(2) The term "person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a goverment or political subdivision thereof. As used in this
paragraph the term "trust" shall include only a trust
where the interest or interests of the beneficiary or beneficiaries are evidenced by a security.
(3) The term "sale," "sell," "offer to sell," or "offer
for sale" shall include every contract of sale or disposition
of, attempt to offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an
offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value;
except that such terms shall not include preliminary
negotiations or agreements between an issuer and any
underwriter. Any security given or delivered with, or as
a bonus on account of, any purchase of securities or any
other thing, shall be conclusively presumed to constitute
a part of the subject of such purchase and to have been
sold for value. The issue or transfer of a right or privilege, when originally issued or transferred with a security, giving the holder of such security the right to convert
such security into another security of the same issuer or
of another person, or giving a right to subscribe to another security of the same issuer or of another person,
which right cannot be exercised until some future date,
shall not be deemed to be a sale of such other security;
but the issue or transfer of such other security upon the
exercise of such right of conversion or subscription shall
be deemed a sale of such other security.
(4) The term "issuer" means every person who
issues or proposes to issue any security; except that with
respect to certificates of deposit, voting-trust certificates,
or collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated investment trust not having a board of directors (or persons
performing similar functions) or of the fixed, restricted
management, or unit type, the term "issuer" means the
person or persons performing the acts and assuming the
duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions
of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which
such securities are issued; except that in the case of an
unincorporated association which provides by its articles
for limited liability of any or all of its members, or in the
case of a trust, committee, or other legal entity, the
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trustees or members thereof shall not be individually
liable as issuers of any security issued by the association,
trust, committee, or other legal entity; except that with
respect to equipment-trust certificates or like securities,
the term "issuer" means the person by whom the equipment or property is or is to be used; and except that with
respect to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, the term "issuer" means the owner
of any such right or of any interest in such right (whether
whole or fractional) who creates fractional interests
therein for the purpose of public offering.
(7) The term "interstate commerce" means trade
or commerce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto among the several States or
between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the
United States and any State or other Territory, or between
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia.
II. OFFERINGS
(a) The Nature of a "Public Offering"
In speaking of a "public offering," the statute refers to transactions which are exempted from registration under the Act in the
following manner:
The provisions of section 77e of this title shall not
apply to any of the following transactions: (1) . . .
transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering . . .3
The paucity of language and the failure of the statute to even hint
at what might constitute a "public offering" has proven to be a
source of no uncertain concern to both the lawyer and the client.
The courts, too, have been plagued no end in determining the
legislative intent pertaining to when a "public offering" shall be
deemed to exist; in which event compliance with the statute and
its registration aspects become mandatory. A resort to the legislative history of the section aids little in clarifying the congressional intent except as may be gleaned from the House Committee's
reference to this exemption as permitting "an issuer to make a
specific or an isolated sale of its securities to a particular person.''
(b) Administrative Interpretation
During the early history of the Act, much confusion arose as
to the precise meaning of the second clause of Section 4(1) of the
Securities Act which exempts "transaction by an issuer not in115 U.S.C. Sec. 77d (1951).
4 H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. (1933) 15-16.
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volving any public offering." Not only was it brought to the attention of the Commission that small issuers were resorting to socalled "private financing" which in many instances was probably
in circumvention of the law, but in addition that large issuers were
also resorting to this device to the detriment of the public based
on their failure to disclose pertinent information relating to the
company.
In view of the dearth of either administrative or judicial interpretation at that time of what constituted a "transaction by an
issuer not involving any public offering," the Commission through
its General Counsel issued an administrative opinion - setting
forth the various factors which must be considered in determining
the availability of this statutory exemption. It also made clear
that the determination of what constitutes a "public offering" is
essentially a question of fact, in which all surrounding circumstances are to be taken into account. In the opinion, the Commission set forth the following four principal factors for guidance:
(1) The number of offerees and their relationship to each other
and to the issuer; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size
of the offering; and (4) the manner of offering.
(1) The Number of Offerees and their Relationship to Each Other
and to the Issuer.
At the outset it should be remembered that there is no precise
number of offerees which may be used as an overall guide in determining when a "public offering" exists. It is also important to
note that the word "offerees" is not confined to the number of
actual buyers, but rather the number of persons to whom the
security in question is offered. Succintly stated, any attempt to
dispose of a security would be regarded as an offer within the
purview of the first principal factor. Preliminary conversations
or negotiations may be considered attempts at disposition if a
substantial number of prospective purchasers are dealt with. In
such case, the offering might be considered a "public offering" with
the statutory prerequisite of registration coming into play.6
The question then arises as to what constitutes a substantial
number of offerees. Actually, there is no mathematical formula
precise enough to answer this particular question. But the basis
on which the offerees are selected is a factor of major significance
in determining whether a "public offering" exists or not. Consequently, an offering to a given number of persons recruited at random from the general populace on the basis that they are possible
purchasers may be considered a "public offering," even though an
offering to a much larger group of persons who are all the members
a
cula las
iLe.. employees of a large concern, might be
considered a "private offering." On the other hand, there are instances where an offering confined to a particular group and ofSec. Act. Rel. 285 (1935).

'15 U.S.C. Sec. 77d (1951).
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fered to a sufficiently large number of persons may nevertheless
be considered a "public offering."
The relationship between the issuer and the prospective purchasers is also a matter to be given due weight. Concretely, an
offering to persons of a group who should have special knowledge
of the issuer is less likely to be a "public offering" than is an offering to the members of a class of the same size who do not possess
this advantage. In a case where a group of important executive
officers would have a close relationship to the issuer which ordinary
employees would not enjoy, the factor of relationship would be
particularly important in offerings to employees.
(2) The Number of Units Offered
In regard to the denominations of the units, the offering of
an unsubstantial number of units might presumably be an indication that no "public offering" would be involved. On the other hand,
the offering of many units in small denominations might indicate
that the issuer recognizes the probability of a distribution of the
security to the public at large. At this time, it would be well to
again stress the fact that the purpose of the exemption of nonpublic offerings would appear to have been to make registration
unnecessary in those relatively few cases where an issuer desires to
consummate a transaction or a few transactions and where the
transaction or transactions are of such a nature that the securities
in question are not likely to come into the hands of the public at
large.
(3)

The Size of the Offering
A perusal'of the language of the statute 7 reveals that the exemption pertains to "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering." Apropos the wording of this part of the statute,
it would be well to consider not merely the immediate particular
transactions between the issuer and the initial offerees, but also
the likelihood of a later public offering of all or part of the securities sold. It would therefore appear to follow that the statutory
exemption was intended to apply mainly to small offerings, which
in their very nature are less likely to be offered to the general
public than would be large offerings.
(4) The Manner of Offering
In view of the fact that the purpose of the exemption of nonpublic offering is limited in the main to instances wherein the
issuer has in mind to consummate a few transactions with specific
offerees, it would appear that those transactions which are negotiated by direct contact between the issuer and the initial purchaser
are less likely to be considered "public offerings" than those brought
about through the utilization of those means normally used for
purposes of public sale and distribution.
It should further be kept in mind that any dealer who might
15 U.S.C. Sec. 77d (1951).
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subsequently purchase securities from an initial purchaser would
be required to satisfy himself that the initial purchaser had not
purchased with a view to distribution. If the initial purchaser had
bought with the intent to distribute, he would be considered an
underwriter, and sales by a dealer of securities bought by him
from such an initial purchaser, would, as a general rule, not be
exempt until at least a year after the purchase of the securities
by the dealer. The sale of unregistered securities to a limited number of initial purchasers, therefore leads to a practical situation
in which such initial purchasers may have difficulty in disposing
of the securities purchased by them. Of course, ultimately each
case is to be decided on its own facts and no magical formula may
be availed of to fit each and every conceivable situation in order
to determine whether the situation is one involving a "public offering" or a "private offering."
(c) Judicial Interpretation
Although the interpretation by the Commission as to what
constitutes a "public offering" is entitled to great weight," it was
for the courts to have the final word as to whether a transaction
was to be considered either a "private" or a "public" offering. As
we move into the judicial sphere of operations we note that the
first case of importance to come before the courts to decide whether
a transaction was a "private offering" and therefore exempt from
registration under the Act was the case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. The Sunbeam Gold Mines Co. et al.9 In that case the
defendant Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., a Nevada corporation, with
stockholders in various states of the union, entered into an agreement with another company, the Golden West Consolidated Mines,
to purchase all the assets of the latter, subject to the approval of
the stockholders of both companies. While the agreement was
pending this approval, the defendant company issued through the
mails a number of letters-530, to be exact. Of the 530 recipients,
115 were stockholders of the defendant Sunbeam Company; 207
were stockholders of the Golden West Mines; and 208 were stockholders of both companies. These 530 persons were scattered
through various states. The letters solicited pledge loan agreements from the stockholders for the purposes of completing the
purchase by the Sunbeam Company of the assets of the Golden
West Mines and of raising enough money to register a contemplated new issue of stock with the Securities and Exchange Commission. On the basis of these facts, the Commission brought this
suit under Section 20(a) of the Act 1o authorizing injunctions
against issuance of securities in violation of the Act.
Although the court below, in denying an interlocutory injunction, held that the shareholder's loan receipt was a security within
Campbell v. Degethner, 97 F. Supp. 975, 977

'95

F. 2d 699 (C.C.A. Wash.) 1938.
115 U.S.C. Sec. 77t(a).

(1951).

Sept.-Oct., 1955

DICTA

the meaning of the Act and that its distribution through the mails
over state lines did make it subject to the required registration
proceedings, it nevertheless held that such a distribution to stockholders did not involve a "public offering." The language of its conclusion of law is:
The transactions by the defendants herein, being
solely with stockholders of Sunbeam Gold Mines Co. and
Golden West Consolidated Mines, all of said stockholders
being stockholders of respondent company through merger of said corporations, do not, irrespective of the number of said stockholders, involve a public offering within
the meaning of Sec. 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended; and the plaintiff's application for preliminary
injunction is therefore denied.
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, the Appellate Court reversed the lower court and held that
the offering of securities was a "public offering" and hence not
within the exception to the requirements of the Securities Act of
1933. In coming to this conclusion that the offering involved herein
was a public one, the court proceeded to trace the legislative history of the section. In one of the House Reports 11 the court restated the language of the House, to-wit:
Sales of stock to stockholders become subject to the
Act unless the stockholders are so small in number that the
sale to them does not constitute a public offering.
In further tracing the legislative history of the section pertaining to "public offerings," the court went on to say:
Again, in 1934, when the Securities Act was amended,
15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 77b et seq. and notes, a proposal to exempt from registration securities offered by an issuer to
its employees was rejected by the Committee of Conference of the two Houses. In this connection, the Managers
on the part of the House stated: "The conferees eliminated the third proposed amendment to this subsection on
the ground that the participants in employees' stock-investment plans may be in as great need of the protection
afforded by availability of information concerning the
issuer for which they work as are most other members of
the public." H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p.
41.
These Reports clearly demonstrate that the Congress
did not intend the term "public offering" to mean an offering to any and all members of the public who cared to
avail themselves of the offer, and that an offering to stockholders, other than a very small number, was a public
offering.
H. R. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. (1933) 25.
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Cases are cited by the appellees in which are given
interpretations of the word "public" in regulatory statutes. None is shown to have the legislative history of the
Securities Act and none applies the rule of strict construction of the instant exception to the general policy of the
legislation required by the Supreme Court.
We therefore hold that an offering of securities under
the Securities Act of 1933 may be a public offering though
confined to stockholders of an offering company, a fortiori
where the offerees include the stockholders of another
company,
though seeking to become stockholders of the
12
offeror.
In this case, the court also pointed out that an issuer of corporate stock who pleads the exemption from registration requirments afforded to transactions not involving any "public offering,"
has the burden of proving that a "public offering" was not involved.
The issuer in this case had clearly failed to establish his burden
of proof.
In 1943, another case of importance pertaining to the question
of a "public offering" came before the same Appellate Court.' 3 In
this case, the appellant, who was President of the Merger Mines
Corporation, lent to the said corporation 772,541 shares of stock
of the said corporation, which were to be used to satisfy the company's stock liability to certain other companies and also its liability to other creditors. It was understood that the articles of
incorporation would be amended so as to increase the stock authorization by a million shares, and that the stock would be returned
to appellant out of the "new issue of stock."
Acting as amicus curiae, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a brief addressed solely to the proposition that the
court below erred when it decreed that the stock to be offered to
appellant and to the 1100 other stockholders of the company need
not be registered with any governmental regulatory body. It was
argued that, although Section 3(a) (10) of the Securities Act of
1933, as amended, 14 exempts any security that was issued in exchange for outstanding securities or other interests where the
terms of issuance and exchange are approved by a court or other
proper governmental authority after a prescribed hearing; that in
the present case the court found that no such hearing had been
held. The court went on to say:
The hearing must be one "at which all persons to
whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange
shall have the right to appear." No one contends that the
requirements for such a hearing have been met in the
case at bar; for the section provides that the hearing
95 F. 2d 699, 702 (C.C.A. Wash.) 1938.
"137 F. 2d 335 (C.C.A. Wash.) 1943.
15 U.S.C. Sec. 77c(a) (10) (1933).
'2
1
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shall be specifically upon the "fairness" of the "terms and
conditions" that are "approved" by the court or other
authority.
The Commission then argued that the proposed stock issue did
15
not come within the exemptions of Sec. 4(1) of the Act, which
reads as follows:
Section 4. The provisions of section 5 (making unlawful the failure to register) shall not apply to any of
the following transactions:
(1) Transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer; transactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering; or transactions by a
dealer (including an underwriter no longer acting as an
underwriter in such transaction), except transactions
within one year after the first date upon which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or
by or through an underwriter (excluding in the computation of such year any time during which a stop order
issued under section 8 is in effect as to the security), and
except transactions as to securities constituting the whole
or a part of an unsold allotment to or subscription by such
dealer as a participant in the distribution of such securities by the issuer or by or through an underwriter.
The Commission also urged that the foregoing provision did
not exempt the proposed offering of the company's stock to the
1100 stockholders and cited the Sunbeam Gold Mines case in support of its contention.
The Commission further argued that Sec. 4(1) did not exempt any public offering by appellant of the stock acquired by him
for resale, for in that event appellant would come within the definition of "underwriter" in Sec. 2(11) of the statute,1" the pertinent
part of that section reading as -follows:
The term "underwriter" means any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security
The court then went on to say:
As the amicus curiae brief points out, the appellant
Pearson will probably reoffer to the public at least a
part of the shares that they acquire from the company.
Accordingly, registration would have to be effected by the
appellant corporation before the shares could be reoffered
by Pearson.
Furthermore, there is no need for the decree in this
case to contain any reference to registration in connec' 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77d(1) (1933).
1015 U.S.C. Sec. 77b(11) (1933).
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tion with Pearson's allotment of the stock. If they take
the shares with the view to investment, the exemption
will apply by operation of law. If, on the other hand,
they acquire the shares with a view to reselling them to
the public, section 4(1) will have to be enforced regardless of any attempted exemption set out in the decree.
The court concluded its decision with the following
language:
The decree of the court below should be modified so
as to eleminate any reference to exemption from registration "with any governmental regulatory body . . .,17
That same year, 1943, another case of significance was brought
for decision before the Federal Court. That case was Corporation
Trust Co. v. Logan."s In that case, the facts disclosed that certain
persons as owners of 373,791 shares of Class B stock of MissouriKansas Pipe Line Company, a Delaware corporation (herein called
"Mokan"), entered into a Voting Trust Agreement dated April 12,
1943. On July 22, 1943, the shares of stock were delivered for
deposit with the Industrial Trust Company of Wilmington, the
agent named in the agreement. Instruction letters and signed stock
powers were deposited along with the shares. After copies of the
trust agreement were filed at the offices of Mokan and Industrial
Trust Company, the latter as agent issued temporary Voting Trust
Certificates for delivery to the depositing stockholders in exchange
for their shares in Mokan. There was no understanding between
the stockholders for a registration statement or any attempt to
comply with the Securities Act of 1933. The defendants thereafter
tendered their temporary Voting Trust Certificates and asked the
Court to decree that their original issuance was illegal.
The essence of their cross claim, as amended, was that there
was a total failure to comply with the Federal Securities Act of
1933 19 in connection with the creation of the Voting Trust Agreement. And since the issuance of Voting Trust Certificates under
that agreement was in violation of law, the exchange of securities
thereunder should be rescinded and set aside.
The Court held that the Voting Trust Agreement for the issuance of Voting Trust Certificates in exchange for the stock of
the corporation which had an authorized capitalization of 5,000,000
shares, of which about 800,000 shares were outstanding among
3,500 holders, contemplated the issuance of "securities" in connection with a "public offering" within the Act. In rendering its decision, the Court used the following language:
It is clear that the case at bar comes within, the first
classification of Sec. 12 which relates to unlawful sales
' Merger Mines Corporation et al. v. Grismer, 137 F. 2d 335, 341, 342 (C.C.A.
Wash.) 1943.
152 F. Supp. 999 (1943).
" 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77a et seq. (1933).
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of securities for which no registration statement has been
filed. Under that section, the remedy afforded is the right
to sue, either in law or in equity, "to recover the consideration paid for such security . . ." As the Voting Trust
Certificate is, under the statute, the security, the consideration paid in exchange therefor can only be the Mokan
stock, and it is this stock which defendants seek to have
restored to them upon the tender of their trust certificates.
I conclude the statute authorizes the relief prayed for
here.
The next case of importance to come before the Federal Court
was the case of Campbell v. Degenther.2 0 This too was an action
under the Securities Act of 1933 21 to recover the consideration
paid for undivided interests in oil well drilling operations. The
facts disclose that the defendant was engaged in the drilling for
oil and gas in the State of Michigan. To finance the projects, uiidivided interests in the leases which he held were sold to various
persons, among whom were the plaintiffs.
The business venture was not advertised nor was any other
means employed to disseminate the information to the general
public. The parties became acquainted through mutual business
associates and the investments of the plaintiffs with the defendant
produced commercially productive wells in some instances.
The problem that came about in this case arose out of the
investments made by the plaintiffs with the defendant in the drilling of Howard Well No. 1. There were 32 shares sold in said well
at a cost of $127.40 per share. Each of the plaintiffs purchased one
share or a one thirty-second interest. The well was drilled in as
a dry hole.
Plaintiffs contend that prior to the sale of said interests there
was no registration statement in effect nor any
prospectus issued
22
.as required by Section 5 of the Securities Act.
By the terms of the Securities Act, plaintiffs ask to recover
the consideration paid for said security, with interest thereon from
April 9, 1948, less the amount of income received thereon, upon
tender of such security.
The Court held that each of the plaintiffs was not entitled to
recover the amount paid for the undivided one thirty-second interest in Howard Well No. 1. In summing up its decision, The
Court stated the following:
The defendant has satisfied the required burden of
proof to establish himself as exempt from the provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933. By reason of the small
number of participants in the venture and their familiar" 97 F. Supp. 975 (1951).

"15 U.S.C. Sec. 77a et seq.

2115 U.S.C. Sec. 77(e) (1951).
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ity with each other, I cannot translate the security transactions into a public offering.
At most, the transactions herein conducted were a
close-knit arrangement among friends and acquaintances
on a purely personal basis, without any systematic scheme
or promotion program for sale of said securities to the
general public or any select group sufficient in size to fall
within the province of a public offering.
Another case of importance came before the United States
District Court for the District of Nevada during the early part of
1953. That was the case of Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Searchlight Consolidated Mining & Milling Co. 2 3 The facts in that
case disclosed that the defendants had been selling securities,
namely, shares of the common capital stock, 10¢ par value, of
defendant, Searchlight Consolidated Mining & Milling Co.; and in
the sales of such securities had been directly and indirectly using.
the mails and means and instruments of transportation and communication in interstate commerce. And at no time had a registration statement with respect to such securities been in effect
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
One of the specifications in the motion to dismiss raised by
the defendants was that solicitation by the defendants was confined to existing stockholders, and that such stockholders were not
to be considered as members of the public.
The Court made short shrift of this contention by the defendants and held that the offering of securities was a "public offering" and therefore not within exemptions to the provisions of the
Act requiring disclosure of information even though solicitation
was confined to existing stockholders. Again, the Sunbeam Gold
Mines case was cited by the Court in support of its holding.
Despite the adjudications of the Federal Courts on the question of "private" or "public" offering, no tangible criteria evolved
as a guide of reliability from these decisions. No specific formulae
were set forth by any of the judicial tribunals before whom such
cases were brought for adjudication.
Finally, on June 8, 1953, the leading case on the subject of
"public offering" was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States. That case was Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Ralston Purina Co.2 4 The facts in that case disclosed that Ralston
Purina sold nearly $2,000,000.00 of stock to employees of the company residing in many different states without registering with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. In so doing, it had made
use of he ma-ls. The Ralston Company contended that the shares
were sold only to key personnel in keeping with its policy of encouraging its employees to become stockholders of the corporation.
F. Supp. 726 (1953).
'346 U.S. 981 (1953).
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Both the District Court 2 and the Circuit Court 2"held that
the offering
was a "private offering" and within the exemption of
27
the Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that
the issue was not a "private offering" within the exemption of the
Act. In its decision, the Supreme Court said that some employee
offerings may be exempt. For example, an offering limited to
executive personnel who because of their position have access to
the same kind of information that the Act would make available
in the form of a registration statement, would come within the
exemption. The number of persons to whom the offer is made does
not determine whether the offering is "public" or "private." The
Supreme Court laid down four criteria to determine whether the
offering is "private" or "public". If the offering comes within
these criteria, it is a "private offering" and not a "public offering."
The criteria are:
(1) That the offering is limited to a special class and
not to the public generally;
(2) That the purchasers of the shares intend to take
the shares for investment and not for resale;
(3) That the purchasers have access to the kind of
information which a registration statement would disclose;
(4) Whether there is a need of the offerees as a class
for protection afforded by registration.
In its decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the Ralston Purina Co. failed to prove that its offering to
employees came within the criteria establishing a private offering.
The offering was not limited to key personnel but was made available to any one of its 7,000 employees. The exemption, the Court
said, does not deprive corporate employees from the safeguards of
the Act. A thorny problem had at last received a final adjudication.
III. CONCLUSION
In answer to the original query, it may now be stated that
whether or not a proposed offering or sale of securities of a corporation in interstate commerce is "private" or "public" ultimately
depends upon whether the issuer can sustain the burden of proving facts sufficient to make the offering a "private offering" within
the tests of the Ralston Purinacase as laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States. It is hoped that the decision in this
case and the criteria enumerated by the highest court of the land
will prove a beacon of light for future guidance to both Bench and
Bar in resolving the time honored question of "private" or "public"
offering.
2 102 F. Supp. 964 (1952).

2200 F. 2d 85 (8th Cir. 1952).
"15 U.S.C. Sec. 77d(1) (1951).
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Notes From The Secretary
President Thomas K. Younge received over 400 requests for
assignment to Colorado Bar Association committees. Unfortunately, he could not satisfy all requests. The assignments will be
mailed to the new committee members within the next few weeks,
and the names of the members on the new committees will be
published in the Annual Report that should be out by the end of
this year.
Because there was such a demand for the Mining Law and
Oil & Gas Committees, approval has been granted by the Board
of Governors to enable these committees to become sections. These
sections will be in operation during the end of this fiscal year and
will provide an opportunity for more members of the Association
to become active in these fields of the law.
CANON 7. PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICTS OF OPINION

A client's proffer of assistance of additional counsel should
not be regarded as evidence of want of confidence, but the matter
should be left to the determination of the client. A lawyer should
decline association as colleague if it is objectionable to the original
counsel, but if the lawyer first retained is relieved, another may
come into the case.
When lawyers jointly associated in a cause cannot agree as
to any matter vital to the interest of the client, the conflict of
opinion should be frankly stated to him for his final determination.
His decision should be accepted unless the nature of the difference
makes it impracticable for the lawyer whose judgment has been
overruled to co-operate effectively. In this event it is his duty to
ask the client to .relieve him.
Efforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the
business of another lawyer, are unworthy of those who should be
brethren at the Bar; but, nevertheless, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel, generally after communication with the lawyer of whom the complaint is made.
OPINION 10-A lawyer may accept employment to handle a matter
which had previously been handled by another attorney, provided
that the other lawyer has been given notice that his employment has
been terminated.
OPINION 130-A lawyer who was not informed that his client had
previously employed another lawyer may proceed with the case, though
he learns at the time set for trial that the other lawyer had been
employed.
OPINION 209--A lawyer may accept employment in a case where another lawyer appeared of record and his employment has been terminated by the client.
(Continued on Page 396)
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THE SCOPE OF THE PHRASE "INTERSTATE
COMMERCE"-SHALL IT BE REDEFINED?
By THOMAS A. GILLIAM, of the Colorado Bar

"It is to Marshall that we turn for the description of the power
confided to Congress and its scope."-Chief Justice Hughes.'
Occasionally, judges are badgered by Philadelphia lawyers
into a rather extraordinary position. In 1946, Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin 2 was decided by the Supreme Court,
a case which calls for some redefinition of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the United States Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.
The Prudential case upheld the validity of the McCarran Act3
enacted in view of United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Association,4 in which the Court had declared that insurance is an
interstate business. Since before the latter decision, insurance was
generally thought not subject to the commerce clause, notably an
implication derived from Paul v. Virginia 5 the states had evolved
regulation of this phase of commerce, which Congress, by the
McCarran legislation, sought to implement and develop. The effect
of the Act was to declare, "that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest, and that silence on the part of Congress shall not
be construed to impose a barrier" to such regulation or taxation.
In sustaining the validity of the Federal legislation, Mr. Justice Rutledge also answered the attacks made by the insurance
company on a state tax law, which for purposes of discussion he
assumed to be discriminatory:"
Here both Congress and South Carolina have acted,
'The Supreme Court of the United States, 143 (1928).
2 328 U. S. 408, 66 S. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342, 164 A. L. R. 476.
'59 STAT. 33, 15 U. S. C. A. 1011-1015 (1945).
322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944); rehearing denied in
323 U. S. 811, 65 S. Ct. 26, 89 L. Ed. 646 (1944).
575 U. S. 168, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869); Hooper v. California, 155
U. S. 648, 15 S. Ct. 207, 39 I Ed. 297 (1895). For a similar situation in baseball,
of. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200, 42 S. Ct. 465, 66 L. Ed. 898 (1922), and Gardella v.
Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402 (2nd Cir., 1949).
6Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, note 2 supra, 429.
While Amendment XIV, Sec. 1, provides that no person shall be denied by a
state the equal protection of its laws, this to Rutledge was a dangerous blurring
of ideas. See Robertson v. People of the State of California, 328 U. S. 440, 66
S. Ct. 1160, 90 L. Ed. 1366 (1946); Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54
S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L., R. 1469 (1934); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U. S.
35, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L. Ed. 744 (1868); Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 62
S. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed. 119 (1941) Douglas, concurring opinion.
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and in complete coordination, to sustain the tax. It is
therefore reinforced by the exercise of all the power of
7
government residing in our scheme.
And with reference to constitutional attacks made by Prudential 8
on the Congressional legislation itself, his answer was even more
out of the ordinary to the effect that these arguments are:
On the theory that no more has occurred than that
Congress has "adopted" the tax as its own, a conception
which obviously ignores the state's exertion of its own
power and, furthermore, seeks to restrict the cooridnated
exercise of federal and state authority by a limitation
applicable only to the federal taxing power when it is
exerted without reference to any state actionY (Italics
supplied.)
And while state action was not elevated to the same plane as the
congressional, the effect is virtually the same. 10 This superstate
idea appears elsewhere in the opinion with reference to federalstate action. A gestalt results, the whole is greater than its parts.
To justify this conclusion Justice Rutledge reflected that beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden," in the silence of Congress, i.e., when
that body has not acted under the great powers given it by the
commerce clause, the Court has often taken the initiative. The
author of Gibbons v. Ogden, Justice Rutledge, explained in a footnote quote was obliged to do so by necessity, saying, "Judges legislate interstitially and the interstices were great in Marshall's

time."

12

Although there have been times when Congress had not agreed
with the efforts of the Court as a substitute legislature, and had
later disavowed the legislation; nevertheless he went on:
The fact remains that, in these instances, the sustaining of Congress' overriding action has involved something beyond correction of erroneous factual judgment in
deference to Congress' presumably better-informed view
of the facts and also beyond giving due deference to its
conception of the scope of its powers, when it repudiates,
7Id. at 435-436.
8

Of this it was said at p. 412, "The versatility with which the argument in-

verts state and national power, each in alternation to ward off the others incidence, is not simply a product of protective self-interest. It is the recurring
manifestation of the continuing necessity in our federal system for accommodating the two great basic powers it comprehends."
9 Id. at 438.
"Note 6 supra.
1"22 U. S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
"Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 413, note 2 supra, citing
Ribble, State and National Power Over Commerce 47. Ribble's paper grew out
of Dean Stone's assignment, note 68 post.

Sept.-Oct., 1955

DICTA

just as when its silence is thought to support, the inference that it has forbidden state action. 1
14
This "something beyond" involved is never quite explained,
but an act of Congress had never before been elevated above the
Constitution. Marshall saw to that.'; Perhaps the Court was saying that the origin of its own power to act in the silence of Congress is obscure, and if Congress speaks what authority have we
to say, nay? Chief Justice Hughes once said, "the Constitution
is what the judges say it is,"' 6 but isn't it another matter, altogether, to say that the Constitution is what the Congress says it
is when it sanctions state action? Justice Rutledge, nevertheless,
felt that such sanction was supported by "the whole trend of decision." 1 Equally obscure, however, as the source of the Court's
power in the silence of Congress, is in coexistence with the former,
the origin of the power of Congress to enable the states to do that
which they otherwise could not.'6 Perhaps what Rutledge meant
was that, when the states and federal government form a partnership in regulation, something in the nature of a treaty results. If
this be the case the necessity of redefinition is manifest, or at least
a historical reexamination of the trend of decision is indicated,
and since as all these matters troubled Marshall in the great case
of Gibbons v. Ogedn, it might be advisable to turn first, as all decisions do, to that decision.
THE SCOPE OF THE POWER

Marshall has been much maligned. 19 He has left the impression of being the true apostle of federalism, the autocrat of the
bench, the uncompromising figure of judicial supermacy. Never
a popular figure, he filled the bill. And yet in Gibbons v. Ogden,
his only popular decision, 20 and in Willson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh Co."1 he possibly indicated, at the beginning, the whole
scope of the commercial power, and upon review, as reexamination
of legends often do, the impression left by Marshall is somewhat
different from that assumed.
1Id. at 425-426.
" An explanation possibly lies in Article 1, Sec. 10, Cl. 2 of the CONSTITUTION: No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its Inspection Laws.
"Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 137, 1 Cranch. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
"Cited by Abel, Commerce Regulation Before G4bbons v. Ogden; Interstate
TransoprtationFacilities, 25 N. CAR. L. R. 12 (1947).
,7 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 433, note 12 supra.
'sMurphy, Insurance Under the Commerce Clause. 33 IA. L. R. 91, 100
(1947).
" See Abel, Commernce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden, Trade and Traf-

fic, 14 BROOKLYN L. R. 38, 215 (1941); Green, Solm, Heretical Renlirks on the
Federal Power Over Coimm erce. 31 MiN. . L. R. 121, 148 (1947).
'Mendelson,

Ncw Light on, Fietcher v. Peck and Gibbov.s r. Oydeni.

L. J. 567 (1949).
2'27 U. S. 245, 2 Pet. 245, 7 L. Ed. 412 (1829).

58 Y.\r.r
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Gibbons v. Ogden did not involve an instance of a state acting
where Congress had not; on the contrary, a monopoly created by
state law, on steamship traffic on the Hudson was dissolved by
that decision as being in conflict with federal licensing legislation.
As Marshall pointed out, "The sole question is, can a state regluate
commerce with foreign nations and among the states, while congress is regulating it?" 22 The answer to this question, counsel for
the monopoly urged, was that the states have concurrent power
in regulating commerce:
It is remarkable that even the definite article "the"
is omitted. . . . And this omission was not accidental, but
studiously made. By referring to the journals of the Federal convention, it will be found, that the sixth article of
Mr. Charles Pinkney's draft has the words "shall have
the power," etc. In the draft reported by the committee
of five (art. 7) the definite article is still preserved. In
the draft as reported by Mr. Brearly the word "the" is
left out, clearly by design. Notwithstanding that, Mr.
Patrick Henry and Mr. George Mason, and indeed, the
opposers of the constitution generally, thought . . . that
when power was given, it was "exclusively given." . . .
This construction, which was the general foundation of
the opposition to the constitution, was strenuously disacavowed and reasoned against in the Federalist, and
2
tually produced the tenth article of the amendment. 2
It was Justice Johnson in a separate opinion, and not Marshall,
who said that the power was exclusive in Congress, and answered
the above argument with a lawyer's answer:
It is not material, in my view of the subject to inquire whether the article a or the should be prefixed to
the word "power." Either, or neither, will produce the
same result; if either, it is clear, that the article "the"
would be the proper one, since the next preceding grant
of power is certainly exclusive, to wit, "to borrow money
on the credit of the United States." 24
That such power was concurrent, Marshall, however, also refused
to accept, for this would be to imply that the states and the Union
were equal sovereignties, and that the sovereign which exercised
the power first would prevail. Marshall was aware, of course, of
the many instances even in his own time where the states and the
federal government had cooperated and some instances at least
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, 200, note 11 supra. And at 211, "In pursuing
this inquiry at the bar, it has been said, that the Constitution does not confer
the right of intercourse between state and state ... This is true. The Constitution found it an existing right, and gave to Congress the power to regulate
it. In the exercise of'this power, Congress has passed 'an act
" Id. at 85.
"Id. at 226-227.
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where the government had adopted state law.2 Examples. which
he cited, were Acts of Congress of 1796 and 1799 preventing the
importation of slaves into states prohibiting slavery,26 and the Act
of August 7, 1789, adopting state law on the conduct of pilots.2Of these he spoke:
Congress, in that spirit of harmony and conciliation
which ought always to characterize the conduct of governments standing in the relation which that of the Union
and those of the states bear to each other, has directed
its officers to aid in the execution of these laws; and has,
in some measure, adapted its own legislation to this ob2
ejct, by making provisions in aid of those of the states.
And again:
Although Congress cannot enable a state to legislate,
Congress
may adopt the provisions of a state on any
29
subject.
But then he added:
The nullity of any act inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the declaration, that the constitution
is the supreme law. The appropriate application of that
part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on
laws and treaties, is to such acts of the state legislatures,
as do not transcend their powers . . 3:
It is apparent that the great judge did not subscribe to any
theory that congressional legislation adopting state legislation
tended to put both beyond the Constitution. What then was this
power of Congress over commerce? As to this he said:
We are now arrived at the inquiry, what is this
power?
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power,
like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitu31
tion.
And while in other parts of the opinion he described commerce
as "intercourse" :12 and the power of Congress over it as "plenary," 33 and thus "described the federal commerce power with a
Id. at 205-209.
61 U. S. STAT. 474, 619.
R. S. 4235, 46 U. S. C. A. 211 et seq.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, 205, note 33 supra.
-Id. at 207.
"Id. at 211.
Id. at 196.

2

Id. at 189.

'Id.

at 197.
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breath never yet exceeded," 34 merely because he declined to define
the power as "concurrent" does not mean he defined it as "exclusive," 35 except to the extent that when exercised exclusively by
Congress, it became, under the supremacy clause, the supreme law
of the land, subject, of course, to the Constitution. And while the
commerce clause is in the Constitution itself, it is an express power
which has no life sleeping. 36 The power of Congress is to legislate
into being such as it wills from the grant of power given it by
the people:
The Congress shall have Power: . . . To make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
37
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
This was decided by Marshall in Willson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh Company,3 8 and in this case, as contrasted with Gibbons v.
Ogden, the silence of Congress was involved. A dam, prusuant to
state law, had been placed over a navigable stream, and he was of
the opinion:
The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the constitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states; a power which has not been so exercised
as to affect the question.
We do not think that.the act . . . can, under all the
circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant
to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state,
or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subejct. 9 (Italics supplied.)
Now why did Marshall say the latter after deciding the
former? They are inconsistent views. The statement even acquires a certain oracle-like quality. Was it that he foresaw the
enormous power the Supreme Court could wield under such a
doctrine as the silence of Congress, or was he merely saying that
it was only a paper power until exercised? The latter is suggested
in view of what was said by him of Congress in other cases, with
reference to the habeas corpus power of the courts:
"Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942); and
Levy, OUR CONSTITUTION TOOL OR TESTAMENT? 48, "a far more extensive national

control of business than we have yet been allowed by 'the Court to witness'"
(1941).
Cf. Rutledge in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 262 (1946); rehearing
denied 329 U. S. 249, 67 S. Ct. 497, 91 L. Ed. 705 (1947).
Cf. Frankfurter, id. at 254.
t' Article I, Sec. 8, C1. 18, U. S. CONSTITUTION. The Commerce power is among
the foregoing Powers.
27 U. S. 245, note 21 supra.
HId. at 252.
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they must have felt, with peculiar force, the
obligation of providing efficient means by which this great
constitutional privilege should receive life and activity;
for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself
would be lost, although no law for its suspension should
be enacted. 0
CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE

41
The Chief Justice decided another case, Brown v. Maryland,
purportedly bearing on the commerce clause, and participated, ac42
cording to Justice Story in another, City of New York v. Miln,
neither of which would add to the discussion here. It is of interest
to note, however, that Roger Taney, who as an advocate had unsuccessfully argued before Marshall on behalf of the taxing power
of a state in Brown v. Maryland, himself, as Chief Justice, rendered the next important decision with reference to the commerce
clause in The License Cases.43 In these cases, he analyzed Gibbons
v. Ogden in the light of Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company and said, "The passages I have quoted show that the validity
of the State law was maintained because it was not in conflict
with a law of Congress, although it was confessedly within the
limits of the power granted." 44 Marshall, therefore, according to
Taney, never maintained that the federal commercial power was
exclusively vested in Congress in the absence of congressional legislation.
The view persisted, none the less, that he did, possibly perhaps of his rather deprecatory remarks in Gibbons v. Ogden 45 as
to the police power of the state, and in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,4 6 what was apparently believed to be a Solomon decision between Marshall and Taney 47 was handed down in the form of the
following dictum:

It is the opinion of the majority of the court that the
mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce, did not deprive the states of power to regulate
pilots, and that although Congress has legislated on this
subject, its legislation manifests an intention, . . . not
to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to
Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swarthout, 8 U. S. 75, 4 Cranch. 75, 2
L. Ed. 554 (1807).
1125 U. S. 419, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. Ed. 678 (1827). Marshall's observations
here on the commerce clause come under the heading of dicta; the case was
decided on the supremacy of the tax power of Congress, McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U. S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 519 (1819).
42 36 U. S. 102, 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. Ed. 648 (1837).
4'46 U. S. 504, 12 L. Ed. 256, 5 How. 504 (1847).
Id. at 584.

5 22 U. S. 1, 203, note 11 supra.

4653 U. S. 299, 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851).

11Haman, Comment on Dean Milk Company v. City of Madison, 340 U. S.
349, 71 S. Ct. 295, 95 L. Ed. 329 (1950). 8 WASH. & LEE L. R. 202 (1951).
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the several states. To these precise question, . . . this
opinion must be understood to be confined. It does not
extend to the question what other subjects, under the
commercial power, are within the exclusive control of

Congress

48

By Munn v. Illinois,4' in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice
Waite, this dictum had grown:
.. certainly, until Congress acts in reference to
their interstate relations, the State may exercise all the
powers of government over them. . . . We do not say
that a case may not arise in which it will be found that
a State, under the form of regulating its own affairs, has
encroached upon the exclusive domain of Congress . .
Then in Mobile County v. Kimball,5 0 in an opinion rendered
by Justice Field, it was said that the federal commerce power
was exclusive so as far as a uniform rule is required but that Congress by silence in the regulation of harbors, virtually declared
that such may be controlled by state authority. While this decision does not conflict in practice with Willson v. Blackbird Marsh
Company, it conflicts in theory-e.g., Marshall upheld state law
because Congress had not legislated; Field upheld state law because the Supreme Court felt that, considering other instances
where state regulation had been adopted by Congress, the latter
would have acted as the Court did. Thus the foundation laid by
dicta was solidifying into a structure for judicial legislation. It
was but a short step for Field to concur as he did with Justice
Matthews, who spoke for the Court in Bowman v. Chicago and
Northwestern Railway Company,5 ' a case declaring that state legislation, forbidding common carriers from importing intoxicating
liquor into the state without a certificate therefor, was invalid,
because the consent of Congress express or implied was missing;
in other words, the Court felt that had Congress spoken, it would
have required a national uniform rule. Justice Harlan, with whom
Chief Justice Waite and Justice Gray concurred, dissented, and
Justice Lamar did not participate in the Bowman decision, which
introduced yet another word
into the commerce clause, the word,
"consent," was not there. 5 2 The dissenters spoke in vain of the
departure of the Court from the Constitution and precedent:
. . . if therefore, state police power, as the health,
morals and safety of the people may be involved in its
48Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U. S. 299, 320, note 46 supra.

94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877). Waite renounced this dicta in Bowman
v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, note 53 post.
ze102 U. S. 691, 26 L. Ed. 238 (1880). The idea of uniformity is probably
derived from Art. I, Section 8, Cl. 4, of the CONSTITUTION, relating to naturalization and bankruptcy, and which is the next succeeding clause to the commerce
clause.
125 U. S. 465, 8 S. Ct. 869, 31 L. Ed. 700 (1888).
SThe word is probably derived from Article I, Sec. 10, Cls. 2, 3 of the
CONSTITION.
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proper exercise, can be overborne by national regulations
of commerce, the former decisions of this court would
seem to show that such laws of the States are valid, even
when they affect commercial intercourse among the
States, until displaced by Federal legislation, or until they
come in direct conflict with some Act of Congress. Such
was the doctrine
announced in Willson v. Blackbird Creek
53
Marsh Co.
In Leisy v. Hardin a similar question as to the power of a
state to prohibit the liquor traffic was before the Court, as was
presented in the previous case, but the majority decision unfortunately was the same. 54 Fuller, its author, had joined the Court
as Chief Justice; and perhaps the though of judicial legislation
was too tempting a morsel to the new Chief. And it is noteworthy
that the assumption of the majority in both cases, that had Congress acted it would have enacted a uniform rule, was mistaken
because Congress thereafter enacted the Wilson Act,5 5 adopting
the diverse treatment of states, congressional legislation which
Chief Justice Fuller was obliged to uphold.50 With this setback,
the Court, however, took the next obvious step-If there were an
exclusive jurisdiction in the Congress under the commerce power,
there was also an exclusive residue in the states, and an act of
Congress, which invaded the latter, could be limited to that extent. And thus a sugar company in control of the large majority
of the manufactories of refined sugar in the United States was
exempted from the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
since the company's activity was a monopoly on "a necessary of
life," United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 57 A far cry from Gibbons
v. Ogden! The result was that when Congress was silent, state
legislation could be invalidated as encroaching upon the former's
desires even though unexpressed; when Congress spoke, its own
legislation could be curtailed as encroaching on the jurisdiction
of the states.
And, not only in economic legislation but also in social legislation did the judges apply their new-found power. In Plessy v.
Ferguson,58 a state law was upheld that required railway companies carrying passengers in coaches in the state to provide sepa"Bowman v. Chicago Northwestern Railway Company, 125 U. S. 465, 520521, note 51 supra.
5135
U. S. 100, 34 L. Ed. 128 (1890). Despite congressional legislation, oleomargarine was, however, afforded different treatment, Plumley v. Mass., 55 U. S.
461, 15 S. Ct. 154, 39 L. Ed. 223 (1894).
"26 STAT. 313, 27 U. S. C. A. 121 (1890).
"in re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 S. Ct. 865, 3'5 L. Ed. 572 (1891).
"' 156 U. S. 1, 15 S. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325 (1895), involving the Sherman Act,
26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. 1, et seq. Cf. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U. S. 143, 72 S. Ct. 181, 96 L. Ed. 162 (1951). Houston v. E. & W. T. R. Co. v.
United States, (Shreveport Rate Cases) 234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed.
1341 (1914).
"8163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
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rate but equal accommodations for the white and colored races,
whereas a previous statute of the same state requiring carriers
to give equal rights and privileges without distinction as to race
or color was held, so far as it applied to interstate commerce,
void, Hall v. De Cuir.59 In Hammer v. Dagenhart60 a congressional
prohibition of transportation in interstate commerce of the work
of children was held unconstitutional, while another such provision against the transportation of "white slaves" did not so offend.'
CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT
"Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution
Justice Stone in Southof power over interstate commerce"-Chief
62
Arizona.
of
State
v.
Company
Pacific
ern
Then in 1917 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co. and
State of West Virginia 63 sustained a state law, prohibiting importation in interstate commerce of liquor for personal use. If
control of interstate commerce were exclusively vested in Congress what was the justification? It was no answer to say that
Congress had passed the Webb-Kenyon law 64 divesting the article of its interstate character, for then the power of Congress
would be no longer exclusive. It was no answer to say that Congress was aiding the state in the exercise of its police power, for
that had been held exclusively to be in the province of the states.
The answer is found possibly in Gibbons v. Ogden: the power exercised by Congress is a plenary power, which65knows no limits
other than those prescribed by the Constitution.
The surprise, however, that this decision caused 66 and the
surmise as to the source of the theory underlying it 67 may be considered as reflections of the incompatibility of the doctrines of
the doctrines of congressional silence and congressional consent.
The former is based on a theory of exclusiveness of powers; the
latter has its base in the comity of powers. The former presumes
that the need assumed by the Supreme Court for a uniform na- 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1878). This result was obtained by the Court
in Plessy v. Ferguson, note 58 sitpra, at 546, limiting the rule of Hall v. De Cuir
to interstate as opposed to intrastate commerce, a dichotomy significant perhaps
in 1895. Cf. Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198, 21 S. Ct. 594, 45 L .Ed. 820
(1901) ; Campagnie Francaise v. State Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380, 22 S. Ct.
811, 46 L. Ed. 1209 (1902); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 26 S. Ct. 127.
50 L. Ed. 274 (1905); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed.
108 (1902).
e 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922). Cf. Corwin, The
Coommercial Clause Versus States Rights (193'6).
0 Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523 (1913).
325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 (1945).
242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326 (1917).
1 37 STAT. 699, 27 U. S. C. A. 122 (1913).
61Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, note 31 supra.
6 See Dowling and Hubbard, Divesting An Article of Its Intcrstate Character, 5 MisNz. L. R. 100, 253 (1920-21).
61Murphy, op cit. sitpra note 18.
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tional rule would preclude state action, whether Congress had acted
or not; the latter permits Congress to decide to what extent uniformity and diversity should govern. The former makes judges,
legislators; the latter makes legislators, judges, for, as has been
seen, in many of the instances where such legislation has been
enacted, such enactment has been to reverse the Supreme Court.
And because of this, Harlan Stone, while the great proponent
of the power of Congress to redefine the distribution of control
over interstate commerce, was puzzled as to its source, since he
avowedly and frankly was, as a jurist, a great legislator. As a
law school dean, he had assigned his staff after the enactment of
the Webb-Kenyon Act, the task "of finding out all you can about
just how it is that Congress can enable the states to do something
which the Court already had held the states could not do--for
some day that may be an important doctrine." 68 However, as an
associate justice in a dissenting opinion in Di Santo v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,9 his objection was not to the propriety
of striking down state legislation where Congress had not acted,
but in doing so in a situation that he felt called for local treatment
rather than a uniform rule:
The recognition of the power of the states to regulate
commerce within certain limits is a recognition that there
are matters of local concern which may properly be subject to state regulation .
And he added:
In this case the traditional test of the limit of state
action by inquiring whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical,
. . . we are doing little more than using labels to describe

a result

70

All tihs was said by Stone in 1927 when the Court had then
become entrenched as the arbiter of when the states had invaded
the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress or, conversely, of when Congress had infringed upon matters exclusively the concern of the
states. How far had the Qourt wandered from the guiding hand
of Marshall! There followed in the thirties, however, a return to
Marshall, for Congress undertook, in aiding the states during the
depression years, a federal regulatory program which involved
an interpretation of the commerce clause far different from that
which would have been conceived possible under U. S. v. E. C.
Knight Co. and Hammer v. Dagenhart. The Court's reaction was
immediate, however, and in a series of cases, of which Carter v.
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COL.
L. R 547, 552, footnote 19 (1947).
273 U. S. 34, 47 S. Ct. 267, 71 L. Ed. 524 (1927).

SIbid.
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Carter Coal Company 71 and United States v. Butler 72 are 1936
examples, cases which probably precipitated the threat by the
'
President to pack the Court,73
declared much of the legislative
program to be invalid as beyond the reach of congressional commercial power. And then Chief Justice Hughes and Associate
Justice Roberts suddenly changed their minds, and, by joining
the minority of the Court, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone, ruled to
the effect that the commerce clause was broad in scope as Marshall
had envisioned !4 Why?
• . . few attributed the difference in results between
the decisions of 1936 and those in 1937 to anything inherent in the cases themselves . . . the concensus among
lawyers speculating on the Court's sudden reversal was
that the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts believed
that the continued nullification of the legislative program
• . . would lead to acceptance of the President's Court

plan

. . .7

Whether Hughes bowed to expediency or not, the end result
was that very little was left to the states. They were thought
incapable of handling the depression, and congressional aid was
a complete take-over in detailed regulation often in very local
matters. This was the extent of congressional cooperation with
the states in the thirties. In the forties, however, the states' fortunes were stabilized by war, Stone had succeeded Hughes as Chief
Justice, and under his leadership the states came in as partners
again in the complex economy. Stone's dissent in the Di Santo
case became the majority's view in California v. Thompson 76 So
as to overrule the former. There he seemed to say that exclusive
power did not reside in Congress, and in the absence of its pertinent regulation, the states could regulate. Marshall, in Willson v.
Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., was cited by Stone as authority for
7,298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936), and see Cardozo's dissent at p. 324, 327, commenting on the word "direct"-" . . . a great principle of
Constitutional law is not susceptible of comprehensive statement in an adjective."
297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80
L. Ed. 477 (1936).

" Stern, The Comnmerce Clause and The National Economy, 1933-1946; 59

HAsv.
L. R. 645, 681 (1946).
,4 N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, and
81 L. Ed. 893 (1937) ; Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650,
81 L. Ed. 953 (1937); and Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. N. L.
R. B., 301 U. S. 142, 57 S. Ct. 648, 81 L. Ed. 965 (1937), sustaining the Wagner
Act, 49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. 151, et seq. (1935). Interstate commerce probably now includes rainmaking. Notes, 1 STANFORD L. R. 43, 508 (1948-1949);
migratory birds, id. at 514; and possibly a federal commercial code, Johnson,
Comment, 45 Micn. L. R. -101 (1947).
I Stern, op. cit. supra note 73. As early as 1913, Hughes apparently felt
that the commercial power of Congress was all that Marshall said it was; see
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, involving the INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, 24 STAT. 363, 49 U. S. C. A. 11 et seq.
(1887) and see note I supra.
7313 U. S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 931, 85 L. Ed. 1219 (1941).
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such regulation "unless there is conflict with some Act of Congress ;" 7 but then unfortunately, probably unable to resist the
role of the Court as a super-legislature, Stone added that this was
provided that there is no infringement on the national interest
in preserving uniformity in matters of national concern. If any
doubt were cast by this momentary insight, his famous decision
in the Southern Pacific case, an excerpt from which forms a foreword to this part, again emphasized the super-legislative function
of the Court:
For a hundred years it has been the accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the
aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where Congress has not
acted, this Court and not the state legislature is under
the competing
the commerce clause the final arbiter of
78
demands of state and national interests.
The Chief Justice thus chose not to perceive that the doctrine
of congressional silence is at odds with that of congressional consent, express or implied. For the former is founded in the
commerce clause itself, and the Supreme Court functioning under
such doctrine knows no limitation, since that body has the final
say. But what if Congress speaks and takes the place of the Court,
is joint federal state action, permitting the states to do that which
it could not formerly do; does this combine also transcend the
Constitution? Apparently Justice Rutledge, who inherited Stone's
philosophic robes as foremost advocate of both doctrines, thought
so in 1946 in PrudentialInsurance Company v. Butler,79 and this
probably accounts for the implications of that decision.
For while the Court had returned to Marshall in his concept
of the plenary power of Congress so and to his acknowledgment
that the federal government might consent to the states' use of
the police power so as to affect interstate commerce.8 1 Marshall
it might well be believed, had no notion, strong an advocate of the
power of the Court as he was, that it could act for Congress, when
that body was silent.8 2 Thus, while the Court returned to Marshall
to this extent, the return was only partial. The difficulty is that
to retain its powers under the theory of congressional silence is
to magnify the position of Congress, as the Court abdicates and
the former succeeds in power. The danger of this can most clearly
be suggested by Morgan v. Virginia,88 also decided in 1946, wherein
the policy of the Supreme Court had changed since the days of
"Id. at 114.
325 U. S. 761, 769, note 62 supra.
"9328 U. S. 408, note 2 supra.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, note 33 supra.
Id. notes 28 and 29.
Wilison v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U. S. 245, note 39 supra.
328 U. S. 373, 66 S. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946).

.DICTA

Sept.-Oct., 1955

Hall v. De Cuir and Plessy v. Ferguson, and wherein a state
segregation statute was declared invalid since it was a matter, in
the silence of Congress, where uniformity was, by the Court, felt4
desirable. But what then if Congress should adopt state law ?
Can Congress enable a state to do that which constitutionally it
could not do? Or was there ever a question of this? Is not the
answer demanded in the negative provided, of course, that it is
finally realized that the states' inability substantially to affect interstate commerce, in the absence of congressional legislation, is a
court-made rather than a constitutional prohibition?
CONCLUSION

The present position of the Court imposes an intolerable burden on Congress, which since the war particularly has solicited
state help on national problems, help which, under United States
v. Darby 5 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State of Wisconsin,"'!
necessitates express congressional adoption of state law where
Congress does not intend to occupy the field. Even more intolerable, however, is the implication of the Prudentialcase: that when
such consent is given, both federal and state law are, in some degree, beyond the Constitution. Marshall cannot be blamed for this
result, for while he spoke of the "plenary" power of Congress, he
never said that the power was almighty. What he did say was
that, while Congress might permit a state's participation in national problems, such permission,
in every particular, is consent,
7
also subject to the Constitution.
The idea, that in the silence of Congress the Court might act,
is false, born in dicta and flashing into decision in an obscure case.
The Supreme Court, although returning to Marshall in 1937,
nevertheless retained the doctine. To return home part of the way,
however, is perhaps still to remain lost.
84 Justice Rutledge in the Prudential case, indicated that his remarks were
confined to the tax and commercial fields. 328 U. S. 408, 439, note 2 supra.
312 U. S. 100, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941), validating the FAiR LADOR STANDARDS
ACT, 52 STAT. 1060, 29 U. S. C. A. 201 et seq. (1938), overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart, note 60 supra, and virtually annihilating the Tenth Amendment.
Compare, however, Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Wood, 344 U. S. 157, 73
S. Ct. 204, 97 L. Ed. 168 (1952), a shift from the tendency to hold state statutes
invalid where Congress had enacted comprehensive legislation, NATIONAL MOTOR
CARRIER ACT, 49 STAT. 543 (1935), as amended, 54 STAT. 919 (1940), 49 U. S.
C. A. 301 et seq.
88347 U. S. 672, 74 S. Ct. 794, 99 L. Ed .....
(1954), where the Court, reviewing the legislative history of the NATURAL GAS ACT, 52 STAT. 821, 15 U. S. C. A.
717 et seq. (1938), overruled the Federal Power Commission, which had declined
jurisdiction over "gatherers and producers." Cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 322 U. S. 507, 68 S. Ct. 190, 92 L. Ed. 128
(1947), where Justice Rutledge, in view of the same legislative history, treated
the Natural Gas Act in much the same manner as the McCarran Act, note 3
supra. But see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157, 74
S. Ct. 396, 99 L. Ed.--. (1954).
"Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, note 30 supra.
8Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465, note
51 mtpra.
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A VIOLATION OF A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE
-IS IT FISH OR FOWL?*
HON. MITCHEL B. JOHNS, Judge of the Superior Court,
City and County of Denver

And it came to pass that in the Court of General Sessions
in the City and County of Denver, on the 20th day of September
in the Year of our Lord Nineteen Hundred and Fifty-Five, there
was called up for trial before the Honorable Pontius Pilate the
case of the City and County of Denver v. John J. Lazarus.
And the Honorable Judge, clothed in the black raiments of
his office, saith unto the defendant who stood before him:
"Defendant Lazarus, thou art charged by the City of Denver
with the violation of assault, 'how answerest thee?" And the Defendant sayeth: "I answer nil debet, Your Most Worshipful Magistrate."
To which the learned Court replied: "Thou canst not answer
thus. Thou must reply 'guilty, or not guilty' as is the wont in such
cases."
And Lazarus looketh with fear into the eyes of the noble judge
and saith: "How can I answer thee thus? Is it not written in the
Book of Law, in the Case of City of Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo.
94, that a prosecution for the violation of a Municipal Ordinance
punishable by fine or imprisonment is not a criminal proceeding,
but a civil action in the nature of an action in debt. And has it not
been verily said that in reply to an action in debt, one who is not
so indebted answereth 'nil debet.' "
And the distinguished jurist saith unto Lazarus: "So it is
written in the Book of Law that this is a civil case, and so is it
the practice in pleadings to answer thus to an action in debt. But
the law giveth and the law taketh away. And in the book to which
thou referrest there is not permitted such a reply to the violation
of a Municipal Ordinance. Verily thou must plead to the charge,
guilty or not guilty."
And Lazarus replieth to the Court: "Thou art learned, and
thou art the Judge." And the Judge stateth: "I am the judge."
And Lazarus took unto himself two minutes for deliberation,
while the attendants of the Court waited for Lazarus and marvelled
at his audacity. And he finally spake unto the Judge on this wise:
"This most humble defendant desireth not to affront the dignity
of this esteemed Court, but inquireth of the learned Judge if the
lowly defendant be permitted to file an answer as is the custom in
all well established civil tribunals."
Whereupon the black-robed Judge answereth with finality
and saith unto Lazarus: "Thou art permitted no right to formally
answer , for it was thus decided by the worthy justices in Rinn v.
* Address given by Judge Johns before the Law Club in Denver on September 26, 1955.
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Boulder, and it is Written in Dietz v. City of Central, 1 Colo. 323,
that the subtilties of the common law action of debt do not apply
to cases of this type."
And the defendant Lazarus looketh earnestly to the Judge and
saith unto him: "Likewise, is it not practiced in the law that all
actions for violation of Municipal Ordinances are in the name of
the Municipality, and actions in crimes in the name of the People?"
And the Judge replieth unto Lazarus, saying: "Lazarus, thou
art keen in the ways of the law-so it is practiced in the procedures."
And Lazarus, kneeling, imploreth the Judge: "I am thy ignorant servant, without counsel, and with fear in the premises; how
saith thee that for breaches of the ordinances there was brought
before the Judges two cases in the name of the People, to-wit:
"People v. Braisted, 13 Colo. App. 532, and Davis v. The People,
47 Colo. 1; thou art learned and sagacious, thou art the Judge.
How sayest thee?"
And the Honorable demandeth: "I am the Judge. How pleadest thou, guilty or not guilty?"
And Lazarus, hearing the exhortation, trembled and asked
meekly of the Judge: "In the trial in these cases, how balanceth
thee the scales? Requireth thou the quantum of preponderance, or
the quantum of reasonable doubt?"
And the Jurist replieth: "It has long been established that
the rule of preponderance prevaileth."
And Lazarus regardeth the Judge with much apprehension
and saith: "My liberty thou mayest deprive, and my property thou
mayest take by a preponderance-how then, 0 Justice, doest
thou levy an execution against the body and sell at public sale? The
practice of slavery thou are forbidden. Lincoln did so speak, and
our fathers have so declared by blood."
And the Judge replieth to Lazarus, "There shall be no selling
of the body, for these are the days of enlightenment."
And Lazarus inquireth of the Judge: "How then doest thou
do satisfaction-if a fine be duly imposed and I be without fundshath the plaintiff an empty judgment as is the case in the majority
of actions civil?"
And the Judge answereth: "The Chief Justice Steele in 1909
hath declared in Davis v. People, in a prosecution for a violation
of a Municipal Ordinance, the Defendant may be fined and committed until the fine is paid."
And Lazarus exclaimeth: "Oh, Most Worshipful and Esteemed
Magistrate, thou hast stated aforetime that the action is civil and
one in debt, and now thou wouldest impound the body. Have not
our forefathers in the ages of the past forbidden imprisonment for
debt as well as the star chamber, the rack, and the screw? This
lowly and uninformed defendant has long so understood the proscriptions. Thou are learned and thou art wise. Explainest thou

Sept.-Oct., 1955

DICTA

that in this modern day a man may be imprisoned for debt-O
Learned Judge ?"
And the Jurist, casting down his eyes, saith: "Yes, I am the
Judge. How answereth thee, guilty or not guilty?"
And Lazarus, gravely and with timidity, sayeth unto the noble
Court: "It is spoken in the market place among the debtors that
a plaintiff cannot have judgment without proof of damages. How
wilt the Court measure proof of damages for assault-if one striketh lightly or heavily-doest thou measure severity on the scales
of dollars and cents and in days of imprisonment? How can it be
so? And if there be the swearing in of an expert on assault, what
shall be the foundation proper for the receipt of the testimony expert? Thou art just. Thou will require proof of damages as in
action in debt, 0 worthy Justice. Thou art learned in the laws of
evidence. Thou art the Judge."
And the Honorable Justice Pilate replieth on this wise: "I
am the Judge-how sayest thee, Lazarus, guilty or not guilty?"
And Lazarus looketh from side to side and supplicateth unfo
the Judge: "I beseech thee for a jury, that I may lay before my
fellow men my guilt or my innocence."
And the Judge in compassion spake thusly: "Woe unto thee,
Lazarus, a jury thou canst not have."
And Lazarus, his eyes large with disbelief, crieth out: "Is
it not written in the great book of Constitutions that an accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury ?"
And the Honorable spake with authority: "A speedy trial thou
shall surely have, for the rule has long been provided in City of
Greeley v. Hamman, 'The public welfare demands a summary and
speedy prosecution of offenders against municipal ordinances,'
but a jury trial thou shalt not have."
And Lazarus pleadeth: "How can this be? The writing of the
Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the landthe protection of the individual liberty and life of man-the shield
against the onslaught of tyrants and despots. The sages of past
times have so recognized and so upheld. Who dareth to strike
down these inalienable rights, these guarantees so long preserved?
Who dareth ?"
And the Judge picketh up the Book of the Law and spake on
this wise unto Lazarus, saying: "Hearken unto thee-take heed
that ye be not deceived, for much has come to be said in the name
of the Book of Constitutions, but little is understood. It was written in the year 1892 by the Justice Helm in McInerney v. City of
Denver, 17 Colo. 302, on the subject of which thou speakest, and
which I now read to you:
The proposition is urged by counsel that the following offenses against municipal ordinances be prosecuted
by jury trial, viz.: The injuring or obstructing of streets
or alleys, the obstructing or polluting of sewers, the es-
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tablishing of offensive trades or manufactories, assaults,
assaults and batteries, disturbance of the peace, unlawful
assemblages, riots, routs, indecent exposures, the keeping
of gambling houses, of houses of prostitution, soliciting on
the street by prostitutes, carrying concealed weapons,
disturbances of Sunday worship, bunco and confidence
steering, the practice of fakiring devices in fraudulently
selling articles on the sidewalk, etc., etc.
It is needless to say that a judicial recognition of the
right to a trial by jury in all the local offenses above enumerated, would seriously impair the usefulness and efficiency of city governments. Whatever may be the view
concerning the gravity of the offense against a state law,
the very fact that the legislature authorizes the city to
deal with the same subject by ordinance indicates. that to
the legislative mind, the act also properly constitutes one
of those petty offenses regarded as local injuries. The
public welfare, requiring the maintenance of peace and
good order as well as of careful sanitary regulations in
cities and towns, renders summary proceedings in many
cases a necessity. And we are not now prepared to inaugurate the revolution that must follow the announcement
of the doctrine that a jury trial is an indispensable prerequisite. It is hardly necessary to say that such a trial is
not always essential to "due process of law," or that it is
not implied in the principle that every man judicially adjudged against shall have "his day in court".
And Lazarus listeneth intently and spake: "He speaketh much
gobbledygook, and he mentions not the Book of Constitutions."
And the black-robed Judge riseth in his judicial seat and rebuked Lazarus, saying: "Talk not to me of gobbledy gook. Thou
speakest in another century. It is demanded of thee this hour.
how answereth thou, guilty or not guilty."
And Lazarus spake: "They whittle away at the rights of man.
The Book of Constitutions saith that in cases criminal thou shalt
not be called to be a witness against thyself. Wilt thou rule, then,
that if the worthy City Prosecutor calls me to the stand, by the
rule I must answer?"
And the Judge replieth: "The illustrious justices have spoken
not on this matter. I will require thee, if called, to state thy name,
and permit thee to claim thy privilege."
And it came to pass that with this saying the face of Lazarus
lighted up with joy, and he exclaimeth further: "Thou hast a kind
and kindred soul, Your Honor, but thou followest not the Rules
of Civil Procedure. The action is proclaimed civil, as thou hast
said."
Whereupon the Judge instructeth Lazarus more perfectly on
this wise: "The Court Supreme hath many times stated that violation of a Municipal Ordinance although civil is also in the nature
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of a quasi-criminal proceeding. In Green v. Denver, 111 Colo. 390,
the learned Justice Jackson pronounceth as follows, even though
prosecution for the offense may be in the nature of a civil action,
the imposing of a penalty under a muncipal ordinance has the same
purpose as the imposition of a penalty under the criminal law."
And with impatience Lazarus remarketh: "It is civil when the
wind bloweth east and criminal when the wind bloweth west; how
be it in a cyclone? And if it should come to pass that the City
Prosecutor with much zeal presenteth his case and this unfortunate defendant standeth convicted before the Honorable Court,
hath he no recourse to the echelons judicial?"
And the Jurist spoke with knowledge: "Thou canst appeal to
the Court of Superiority."
Whereupon Lazarus inquireth: "And if this lowly defendant
convince you most worshipful and judicial self of his innocence,
canst the City Prosecutor hie him before the tribunal higher and
make him a second time answer to the process?"
And the Justice Pilate knowingly replieth: "This he cannot
do, for it was so passed by the Body Legislature in the Session
Laws of '53."
And the defendant commenteth wearily: "And so the law
travelleth to the side criminal. And in the Court of Superiority,
is there provided for the trial by jury, or doth the review consist
of the record not recorded? How be it, 0 Magistrate? I am without knowledge, and slow to learn."
And the Judge, perceiving the dilemma of the lowly defendant, replieth to him with compassion: "In the Court of higher
judicial authority there is preserved to thee the right to trial by
jury. Thou wilt be granted a trial de novo, just as if thou hadst
never been tried before this tribunal."
And Lazarus gravely remarketh: "They spend much of the
people's money and give a fancy name to twice try an accused.
And if thy servant desireth to climb the ladder judicial, and being
without monies or property to place security, how sayest the law,
is he deprived the right of appeal because he is poor ?"
And the Judge, by this time being already much wearied of
such questioning, answereth: "In the days of old such was the
practice, but it came to pass that on a certain day a poor defendant
with children eleven found himself in such plight, and threw himself on the mercy of the Court of Superiority, and prayed that Ble
be allowed his appeal without the posting of bond. And the Judge,
having mercy on that much burdened and overworked defendant
did permit him to so appeal. And the good legislature looketh down
across the commons and saith: 'These things should not be,' and
therefore it verily changeth the law in the year of our Lord 1955."
And Lazarus spake unto the Judge on this wise: "It is good."
But being in a quandry, inquireth further: "How wilt thou say,
0 Judge. If I prevail not here and take my cause to the tribunal
higher, and impanel a jury, doth the law permit the wind criminal
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to blow over the trial so that if I be guilty and confess my sins to
the jury and appeal to their passions, doth the law permit the
talismen to exercise their compassions and return a verdict of not
guilty as is the wont in cases criminal ?"
And the Judge answereth the defendant: "Lazarus, thou art
learned in the ways of the world, but the law worketh not thus.
As it is written in Lloyd v. Canon City, 46 Colo. 195, that the
cause being civil, the Court hath the power to a verdict direct on
a confession given."
And Lazarus respondeth: "Thou hast verily stated, 'The law
giveth and the law taketh away.' Thou art learned and wise in
the law, distinguished and esteemed Judge. I pray thee, wilt thou
explain to thy humble servant how can this be, and yet be denominated by the high justices as criminal on the quasi-extremity. Thou
art learned and wise and thou art the Judge. How sayest thee
thus ?"
And the Judge commandeth: "I am the Judge, how pleadeth
thee, guilty or not guilty ?"
Whereupon the defendant further emploreth the noble Court:
"Of personal liberty the civil law worketh not the severity as in
the criminal law. I see many of the clients of the lawyers criminal
walk free in the market place, breathing the air in and out. If
this poor subject be convicted, wilt thou permit him the right of
probation ?"
And the Court answereth Lazarus: "Lazarus, thou art searching, but it is not so provided. If thou wert convicted of a crime,
probation thou mightest have, but not so in the Courts Municipal.
If sentenced there, thou wilt be hied to the dungeon."
And despairingly Lazarus cried out: "The wind changeth."
And the Judge commandeth: "Lazarus, my patience thou hast
expended. I hereby demand of thee, guilty or not guilty?"
And thereupon Lazarus spake unto the Judge: "Most worshipful justice, I pray thee, it is provided in the Book of Statutes that
if a defendant criminal be fined for his wrong doing and he be
a pauper and without means, upon the filing of an affidavit proper
he may be relieved. What sayest this proceeding? Wilt thou give
the same right to a violator of the by-law ordinance-the civil
action?"
And Justice Pilate, with finality spake: "0 unfortunate defendant, I make not the law. I interpret and administer the statutes. Abide by them I must, lest I be stricken down with castigation
by the great justices. I adjure thee upon the penalty of contempt,
thou must reply, guilty or not guilty ?"
And Lazarus crieth out, "Thou requireth me to answer to a
mutation, an incongruity, a hybrid. It is neither fish nor fowl. Honest.ly Judge, I answer nil debet."
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE: TRIAL OF ISSUES BY IMPLIED
CONSENT, NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE TO MUTUAL MISTAKE. The case of Carpenter v. Hill seems to have had its inception in a comedy of errors.1 Plaintiff brought suit for rescission
of a contract for the exchange of land on the basis of mutual
mistake.
The contract provided for the exchange of a filling station
owned by plaintiff for defendant's peach orchard. Apparently Tn
good faith defendant informed plaintiff that the land was subject
to a mortgage, but that payments were to be made only out of onehalf each year's crop. Actually the entire balance fell due later in
that year. Before signing the contract plaintiff went to the bank
where the note and mortgage were in escrow and inquired as to
the balance due. He did not ask to see the note, although had he
done so, his belief in the wondrous crop payment arrangement
would have been shattered.
Some time after the completion of the exchange, plaintiff
learned the true facts about the payments. This suit for rescission
followed. Although defendant pleaded only a denial, the issue of
plaintiff's failure to pursue his investigation with due diligence
was brought out in the testimony without objection. The trial
court rendered judgment for the defendant on the theory that
plaintiff's negligence barred his recovery.
On appeal the Court said, "If negligence was a defense, defendants were deprived thereof by failure to file an affirmative
pleading." Rule 8 (c) provides that any matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense must be affirmatively pleaded in
order to be available to the defendant. 2 Clearly the decision was
correct in holding that the nature of negligence as a defense to
mutual mistake is such that it should be specially pleaded.
However, it is possible that the Court overlooked the effect of
Rule 15(b) which provides for trial of issues by implied consent.
The record in the case discloses that on direct examination of the
plaintiff's own witnesses the facts upon which the trial court based
its finding of negligence were established. On cross-examination
this aspect of the case was developed in detail; hence the rule in
question would seem to be applicable.
A long line of federal cases establishes the principle that under
this rule issues which are raised during the trial without objection
Carpenter v. Hill ... Colo ..... 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11, p. 379.
'Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, 8(c).

394
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are to be treated as though they had been pleaded. 3 Of particular
interest is Swift & Co. v. Young which said that the doctrine of
last clear chance could be introduced in this manner. Likewise in
Rogers v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. the court ruled that a set-off could
be allowed when tried by implied consent saying, "That in itself
would require us to treat it as raised by the pleadings."
4
A number of Colorado cases following this same principle.
In the course of the dissent in Borga v. Hendrickson mention was
made of these results:
In construing our rule 15 (b) we have held that in
the absence of motions or objections any issue which the
parties see fit to present may be considered and determined
by the trial court and that the pleadings become functus
officio.
Another issue of interest in the instant case was raised by
the fact that the decision without any comment quoted section 508
of the Restatement of Contracts:
The negligent failure of a party to know or to discover the facts, as to which both parties are under a mistake does not preclude rescission or reformation on
account thereof.
The Colorado Annotation on this section contends that Colorado disagree in theory, but agrees in result by a refusal to.
recognize negligence in cases of mutual mistake. Three cases are
cited in support of this proposition.,
Lloyd v. Lowe was an action by the mortgagee of property on
which defendant had unintentionally assumed the mortgage. The
case is not in point since it was not an action between the parties
to the contract, and the plaintiff was merely denied an unintended
windfall.
Hitchens v. Milner decided shortly thereafter cited Lloyd v.
Lowe as authority. The negligence alleged was failure to read
before signing a contract which the persons's attorney had prepared. In view of the relationship of trust and confidence between
I Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, 15(b); Swift & Co. v. Young, 107 F. 2d
170 (4th Cir. 1939); Rogers v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 145 F. 2d 119 (9th Cir.
1944); Franklin v. Columbia Terminals Co., 150 F. 2d 667 (8th Cir. 1945); Scott
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 151 F. 2d 61 (3rd Cir. 1945); Continental Illinois
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Erhart, 127 F. 2d 341 (6th Cir. 1942).
4 Toy v. Rogers, 114 Colo. 432, 165 P. 2d 1017 (1946); Carlson v. Bain, 116
Colo. 526, 182 P. 2d 909 (1947) ; Scheller v. Mawson, 117 Colo. 201, 185 P. 2d
1009 (1947) ; Craft v. Stumpf. 115 Colo. 181, 170 P. 2d 779 (1946) ; Rose v. Roso,
119 Colo. 473, 204 P. 2d 1075 (1949); U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Bartges, 120 Colo. 317,
210 P. 2d 600 (1949); Rogers v. Funkhouser, 121 Colo. 13, 212 P. 2d 497 (1949);
Hopkins v. Underwood, 126 Colo. 224, 247 P. 2d 1000 (1952).
5 Borga v. Hendrickson, 120 Colo. 303, 209 P. 2d 543 (1949).
6Lloyd v. Lowe, 63 Colo. 288, 165 P. 609 (1917); Hitchens v. Milner Land,
Coal and Townsite Co., 65 Colo. 597, 178 P. 575 (1919); Home Insurance Co. v.
Gaines, 74 Colo. 62, 218 P. 907 (1923).
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attorney and client it may well be true that there was no negligence.
Home Insurance Company v. Gaines was a case in which the
defense presented to the court was laches rather than negligence.
In addition each of the these cases is distinguishable from the
instant case by the fact that no independent investigation was
undertaken and left half-finished. More in point is an early case
in which plaintiff sought to rescind a conveyance of more acres
than he had intended.7 It developed that prior to the conveyance
he had assisted in making a survey of the land and easily could
have ascertained the results. It was held that this neglect prevented his recovery.
Similar facts were present in a recent case which reached the
same result." Defendant's agent innocently misrepresented to
plaintiff the extent of the boundaries of some lots in Denver.
Plaintiff made his own measurement of the frontage on the property, but neglected to measure the depth which had been misrepresented. The court held that this negligence was a defense to a
suit for rescission brought after he had acquired the property.
Comparison of that case with the instant case reveals that on
similar facts, but on different theories, opposite results were
reached. This fact prompts a comparison between the two theories
-one in contract, the other in tort.
Negligence is almost uniformly held to be a defense against
misrepresentation, and under certain circumstances, such as where
the means of knowledge is equally available to both parties, it is a
defense to deceit.9 For an action based upon misrepresentation
the plaintiff must prove that he relied upon the falsehood. It is
also essential that the plaintiff be justified in so relying, and it is
on this basis that negligence is held to be a defense.
Turning to an examination of the cases on mutual mistake,
it is discovered that while there is much language in the decisions
to the effect that "one must bear the consequences of his own folly"' 10
the courts are becoming less insistent upon this maxim." But
where special circumstances exist such as a failure to take ad'Wier v. Johns, 14 Colo. 493, 24 P. 262 (1890).
'Taylor v. Arneill, 129 Colo. 185, 268 P. 2d 695 (1954); noted in 27 Rocky
Mtn. L. Rev., Dec., 1954, p. 115.
'Hanks v. McNeil Corp., 114 Colo. 478, 168 P. 2d 256 (1946); Pestal v. O'Donnell, 81 Colo. 202, 254 P. 2d 764 (1927); Troutman v. Stiles, 84 Colo. 597, 290 P.
281 (1930) ; Slide Mines v. Denver Equipment Co., 112 Colo. 285, 148 P. 2d 1009
(1944); Bosick v. Youngblood, 95 Colo. 532, 371 P. 2d 1119 (1934); EmersonBrantingham Co. v. Wood, 63 Colo. 130, 165 P. 263 (1917); Jasper v. Bicknell,
62 Colo. 318, 162 P. 144 (1916) ; Sellar v. Clelland, 2 Colo. 532 (1875) ; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.) sec. 893. But cf. Pattridge v. Youmans,
107 Colo. 122, 109 P. 2d 646 (1941).
"Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55 (1876); Roller v. California Pacific Title
Ins. Co., 206 P. 2d 694; Muchow v. Central City Gold Mines Co., 100 Colo. 58,
65 P. 2d 702 (1937).
11Corbin on Contracts, sec. 606.
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vantage of a readily accessible means of knowledge, 12 failure to
carry forward an investigation which had been commenced, or a
situation in which the parties could no longer be restored to the
status quo, 13 negligence is still a valid defense. Thus it would seem
that in tort actions where some degree of culpability is usually
involved, the negligence of the plaintiff is more often successful
as a defense than in actions for mutual mistake where the defendant's good faith is assumed. This marvelous anomaly deserves
further study.
At any rate, in the instant case strong equities urge the
adoption of the trial court's findings. Where the means of ascertaining the truth was readily at hand, plaintiff commenced an
investigation. The trial court found that he failed to carry it
through with reasonable diligence. Since the mortgage had been
foreclosed, the parties could no longer be restored to the status quo.
A judgment for damages resulted against a defendant who had
been acting in good faith in favor of a negligent plaintiff. The
Court easily could have arrived at a more desirable result had it
applied Rule 15(b).
WILLIAM E.
"Muchow

KENWORTHY.

v. Central City Gold Mines, sitpra; Eitel v. Alford, 127 Colo. 341,

257 P. 2d 955 (1953).
Grymes v. Sanders, sitpra; Corbin on Contracts, silpra.

Notes from the Secretary
(Continued from Page 372)

8. ADVISING UPON THE MERITS OF A CLIENT'S CAUSE
A lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his
client's cause before advising thereon, and he is bound to give a
candid opinion of the merits and probable result of pending or
contemplated litigation. The miscarriages to which justice is subject, by reason of surprises and disappointments in evidence and
witnesses, and through mistakes of juries and errors of Courts,
even though only occasional, admonish lawyers to beware of bold
and confident assurances to clients, especially where the employment may depend upon such assurance. Whenever the controversy
will admit of fair adjustment, the client should be advised to avoid
or to end the litigation.
CANON

OPINION 82-A lawyer may bring an action for divorce when necessary grounds exist irrespective of the underlying cause; and he may
advise against reconciliation if he believes it to be against the best
interests of his client.

9. NEGOTIATIONS WITH OPPOSITE PARTY
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon
CANON
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the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to
mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.
OPINION 58-It is improper for a lawyer to confer with the adverse
party for the purpose of securing an agreement to a divorce.
OPINION 108-It is improper to interview an adverse party who is
represented by counsel, in the absence of such counsel.
OPINION 124--A lawyer may not negotiate a settlement with the adverse party without the knowledge of the adverse counsel.
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